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Abstract
We compare the performance of a comprehensive set of alternative peer identi-
cation schemes used in economic benchmarking. Our results show the peer rms
identied from aggregation of informed agents' revealed choices in Lee, Ma, and
Wang (2014) perform best, followed by peers with the highest overlap in analyst
coverage, in explaining cross-sectional variations in base rms' out-of-sample: (a)
stock returns, (b) valuation multiples, (c) growth rates, (d) R&D expenditures, (e)
leverage, and (f) protability ratios. Conversely, peers rms identied by Google
and Yahoo Finance, as well as product market competitors gleaned from 10-K dis-
closures, turned in consistently worse performances. We contextualize these results
in a simple model that predicts when information aggregation across heteroge-
neously informed individuals is likely to lead to improvements in dealing with the
problem of economic benchmarking.
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1. Introduction
The need to nd appropriate economic benchmarks for individual rms is a funda-
mental issue for both researchers and practitioners. In many common applications, both
in research and in practice, we aim to secure a relatively objective point of reference,
or a benchmark, by which we can distinguish results (e.g., stock or accounting returns)
attributable to rm-specic factors (such as managerial skill, or an idiosyncratic price
dierential) from results due to common factors (such as those associated with macro
conditions that aect the entire set of economically-related rms). The need to iden-
tify fundamentally similar benchmarks for these purposes arise in applications ranging
from performance evaluation and executive compensation to fundamental analysis, equity
valuation, statistical arbitrage, and portfolio construction.
Recent research in the area of peer identication has uncovered a number of interesting
ndings that point to new ways to think about the age-old problem of economic bench-
marking. Whereas traditional benchmarking methods rely primarily on industry classi-
cation schemes (such as the SIC codes, the Fama and French, 1997 industry groups,
or the MSCI GICS groupings),2 more recent approaches introduce new dimensions by
utilizing novel data sources (such as self-reported competitors in 10-Ks), or new data an-
alytic techniques (such as textual analysis of business descriptions culled from regulatory
lings). Some of these approaches suggest we may need to rethink the relatively rigid
classication schemes associated with industry groupings.
In this study, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the state-of-the-art representa-
tives of four broad categories of peer identication schemes nominated by either recent
academic studies or nancial practitioners as potential solutions to economic benchmark-
ing. First, we consider the Global Industry Classication System (GICS), which has been
2Bhojraj et al. (2003) compares the ecacy of alternative industry classication schemes. Sometimes
these schemes are augmented on other rm attributes, such as size, protability, or expected growth
(e.g., Bhojraj and Lee, 2002).The Search for Benchmarks 2
shown to be at the frontier of the standard industry classication schemes that group rms
into mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive groupings on the basis of similarities
in inputs or product lines. Second, we consider two candidates that represent the fron-
tier of benchmarking schemes that aim to identify product market competitors. One
of these candidates, the \Text Network Industry Classication" (\TNIC"), uses a novel
textual analytical technique to identify rms belonging to similar competitive product
spaces (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, 2014). Specically, the more similar are two rms' 10-
K business descriptions, the more likely they are product market competitors. Another
candidate comes from Capital IQ (\CIQ"), who collects information on rms' self-reported
product market competitors in regulatory lings (Rauh and Su, 2012; Lewellen, 2013).
We examine a third category of revealed-choice-based solutions, that is, schemes which
aggregate individual agents' revealed choices to extract some latent intelligence or reveal
the collective wisdom of investors with respect to the set of economically-related rms. We
consider three candidates of this type: the search-based peers (SBPs) identied by Lee,
Ma, and Wang (2014), hereafter LMW, based on investors' information co-search patterns
on SEC's EDGAR website; the co-searched ticker symbols on Yahoo Finance (YHOO)
(Leung et al., 2013); and the economically-related peers identied on the basis of analysts'
co-coverage patterns of rms (analyst co-coverage peers, or\ACPs"; e.g., Ramnath, 2002,
Liang et al., 2008, Israelsen, 2014, Kaustia and Rantala, 2013, and Muslu et al., 2014).
Finally, we also consider peers from Google Finance (\GOOG") as a leading candidate
from the class of benchmarking schemes based on a hybrid approach.3
Our results suggest that, under appropriate conditions, benchmarks extracted from
the revealed choices of investors exhibit greater and more nuanced fundamental similarity
with base rms. Our ndings conrm and extend the results from LMW. Using a much
longer time-series of EDGAR trac data spanning 2003-2011, we show that their original
3Google Finance provides a list of \related companies" based on a proprietary algorithm. These peer
rms are not identical to co-search-based peers identied by Google Knowledge Graph, and appear to
be at least partially based on Factset industry classication schemes. We therefore refer to these Google
\related companies" as the representatives from a hybrid approach.The Search for Benchmarks 3
ndings hold over a ten-year period from 2004 to 2013, through both up and down
markets. Specically, in either the S&P500 or S&P1500 sample of base rms, SBPs
| peer rms whose fundamentals are most commonly co-searched with the base rms'
fundamentals on EDGAR | explain a much larger proportion of the cross-sectional
variation in base rms' out-of-sample returns, valuation multiples, growth rates, and
nancial ratios than any of the alternative approaches. Among the other contenders,
we nd that ACPs | peer rms that are most commonly co-covered by analysts who
cover the base rm | perform best. YHOO peers | those whose information are most
commonly co-searched with the base rms' on Yahoo Finance | perform relatively poorly.
Similarly, the peer rms identied by Google Finance and peers identied as product
market competitors (TNIC and CIQ) turned in consistently worse performances.
Given SBPs' and ACPs' strong out-performance relative to YHOO, a natural question
emerges: when does information aggregation across the revealed choices of a population
of investors lead to better peer-rm selection? To provide intuition to this question, in
the Appendix, we develop a simple model of aggregated co-search (co-coverage) decisions.
The model features a population of agents, each of whom receives a private signal on the
similarity between the base rm and the candidate peer rm. In this context, we show
that the amount of information that can be gleaned through aggregation will depend on:
(a) the inherent sophistication of the set of individuals involved, and (b) the size of the
sampling population. When the population is \suciently sophisticated" (i.e., when the
bias of the individual signals is low and the precision is high), the information environment
surrounding a rm is of suciently high quality, and when there is a suciently large
number of such agents in our sample making independent choices, their collective wisdom
will lead to superior benchmarks. The model suggests that YHOO peers' relatively poor
performance can be explained by the sophistication of Yahoo Finance users relative to
that of either EDGAR users or sell-side analysts.
We also examine the dierences between SBPs and ACPs. At a certain level ofThe Search for Benchmarks 4
abstraction, SBPs are the result of decisions by buy-side participants (investors) while
ACPs are the result of decisions by sell-side analysts. Although both groups are likely
to be more sophisticated than users of Yahoo Finance, there are dierences in their
incentive structures that could color the peer identication process. In particular, prior
studies show sell-side analysts' stock recommendations tend to exhibit a bias in favor of
larger growth rms with glamor characteristics (Jegadeesh et al., 2004). At the same
time, due to informational constraints (Peng and Xiong, 2006; Van Nieuwerburgh and
Veldkamp, 2010), sell-side analysts tend to specialize in a particular set of industries or
sectors, and are less likely to cover stocks over widely divergent industries (Liang et al.,
2008; Groysberg and Healy, 2013).
These priors are broadly conrmed in our tests. Specically, we nd that ACPs tend
to be more anchored towards GICS industry classication, and exhibit a bias towards
high growth rms. SBPs, on the other hand, are more likely to contain supply chain
partners. We conjecture that these tendencies play an important role in explaining SBPs'
out-performance relative to ACPs in aggregate.
Finally, we show that it is possible to combine SBPs and ACPs results to create a com-
posite solution for identifying economically related rms. These are the best performing
set of economic benchmarks examined in this paper, and outperform the standalone SBPs
in explaining cross-sectional variations in returns. The improvement in performance from
composite peers over that of SBPs is concentrated among the set of smaller base rms.
Consistent with the predictions of our model, these results suggest that there is a greater
value to information aggregation for rms operating in poorer information environments,
where individual investors' signals are less precise.
Taken together, our results point to the aggregation of informed agents' revealed
choices as a particularly promising venue through which to identify economically similar
peer rms. The ecacy of this approach will depend on the intrinsic sophistication of
the individuals in the population (i.e., the inherent level of collective wisdom attainableThe Search for Benchmarks 5
through sampling), the quality of the information environment surrounding the rm, as
well as the size of the sample itself. For the moment, it would appear the state-of-the-art
benchmarking methodology is one that combines rms identied as SBPs and ACPs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides more explicit
evidence of benchmarking behavior in the co-search patterns of EDGAR users and exam-
ines the performance of SBPs relative to six-digit GICS over a ten-year period, from 2004
to 2013. Section 3 compares SBPs' performance to those from alternative state-of-the-art
benchmarking schemes suggested by industry and academic literature. Section 4 investi-
gates the dierences between SBPs and ACPs, and provides evidence on the performance
for a composite revealed-choice-based benchmarking solution. Section 5 concludes.
2. Extended evidence on Lee, Ma, and Wang (2014)
Lee, Ma, and Wang (2014) develop a method for identifying economically-related peers
based on investors' co-search trac patterns at the SEC's EDGAR website. They nd
that rms appearing in chronologically adjacent searches by the same individual (what
they refer to as \Search-Based Peers" or SBPs) are fundamentally similar on multiple
dimensions. Specically, they show SBPs dominate GICS6 industry peers in explaining
cross-sectional variations in base rms' out-of-sample: (a) stock returns, (b) valuation
multiples, (c) growth rates, (d) R&D expenditures, (e) leverage, and (f) protability
ratios. In addition, they show that \co-search intensity" (the fraction of a base rm's
total co-searches owned by a given peer) captures the degree of similarity between rms.
We begin by establishing that the ndings of LMW | that SBPs outperform peers
from six-digit GICS industries in explaining the cross-sectional performance of rm per-
formance | is not a transient phenomenon attributable to the three-year span from 2008
to 2010. Using an extended dataset and a more generalized co-search and robot detec-
tion algorithm, we establish that SBPs' out-performance of GICS6 systematically over aThe Search for Benchmarks 6
ten-year period. We also provide evidence of benchmarking behavior on EDGAR.
2.1. Data and Descriptives
Our data comes from the trac log on the Securities and Exchange Commission's
(SEC) Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) website, and is an
updated version of the data used in LMW. The main advantage of the update is its greater
time coverage; whereas the prior version of the data spans calendar years 2008 to 2011, this
updated vintage contains data on visits to the EDGAR website from calendar years 2003
to 2011.4 The format of the updated data is largely identical to the prior vintage: each
observation in the raw data contains information on the visitor's IP address, timestamp,
CIK, and accession numbers which uniquely matches to a particular company's specic
SEC ling.
An important dierence in this update is that the data extraction process the SEC
used diers from the one employed for the prior vintage of the data; the process was
changed in order to accommodate the longer time series. As a result, the new and the
prior vintages of data are not identical in the overlapping period from 2008 to 2011.
The dierences between these data vintages do not pose an issue so long as they
do not systematically exclude certain types of search trac. To further investigate the
dierences between these data vintages, Panel A of Table A1 reports a variety of daily-
user level search trac characteristics embedded in each of the two raw data samples
in the overlapping time period from 2008 to 2011. Each observation is dened at the
daily-user level, dened as a unique IP address on a given calendar day. We report the
average of daily-user level search characteristics in each data vintage and compute the
dierences in the averages.
An immediate notable dierence between these two vintages is the number of total
daily users contained in the raw data: over the 2008 to 2011 period, the older vintage
4The new data sample extends to March 2012, but we do not use the partial data in 2012 in this
paper.The Search for Benchmarks 7
contains 39.9 million unique daily-IP observations, whereas the updated data contains
35.0 million.5 We also summarize the ling types accessed by users in each dataset, in
terms of the percent of daily-users that access any 10-K's or 10-Q's, proxy lings, forms 3,
4, or 5 (\Insider"), S-1's, SEC comment letters, 13-F's, 13-G's, 13-D's, 6-K's, and 20-F's.
Finally, we summarize and compare the two datasets, in terms of the average number
of unique CIKs (rms) accessed, the number of total clicks (downloads), the number of
unique lings types accessed, the number of unique le extension types accessed, and the
estimated average number of hours spent on the site for a daily-user on EDGAR.
Examining these user characteristics, we conclude that the daily-user level search
characteristics between these two datasets are not systematically and economically dier-
ent. Because there are more than 30 million observations in each dataset, all dierences
between the datasets are statistically signicant at the 5% level. However, none of these
dierences are economically signicant. Across all search and user characteristics ex-
amined, the average absolute percentage point dierence between the old and the new
vintage of the dataset is 1.7%.
Table A1 is also interesting in oering several new stylized facts about raw EDGAR
usage patterns. Specically, we nd that: 53% of daily-users click on either a 10-K or
10-Q, 28% click on an 8-K, 11% click on a proxy statement, and 10% click on an insider
ling (forms 3,4 or 5) or a S-1, with diminishing interest for the other lings considered.
We also report that the average daily-user spends 36 minutes on the site.6
For completeness, Panel B of Table A1 reports means and dierences-in-means in
these daily-user level search characteristics between the early half of the updated data
(2003-2007) and the latter half (2008-2011).7 An immediate dierence to be noted is the
5In un-tabulated reports we conrm that within the overlapping 2008-2011 subsample, the new data
is a strict subset of the prior vintage used in LMW.
6The estimated time on site per day is calculated by adding time spent per user session within a given
day. As dened in LMW, a user session ends when there is no activity within a 60 minute window since
the last action of the user.
7Note that the new data vintage misses several months of data between 2005 and 2006 due to the
SEC's system constraints. Specically, in un-tabulated reports, 93 (111) days in calendar year 2005
(2006) had fewer than 100 daily-users, compared against the sample average of 17,500 daily-users. ThisThe Search for Benchmarks 8
usage of the EDGAR website, which has increased signicantly over time in terms of the
total number of unique daily-IPs: in the ve-year period from 2003 to 2007, there was a
total of 21 million unique daily users on EDGAR, a number that increased to almost 35
million over the four-year period from 2008 to 2011. Usage of EDGAR not only increased
in the extensive margin but also the intensive margin: there was an increase in the average
number of total clicks and unique CIKs and ling types accessed, as well as an increase
in the average total session length in the latter half of the sample period. We note that
some of these increases are likely driven by the increasing presence of web-crawlers or
robots on the Internet, thus highlighting the importance of ltering for automated search
trac in this line of research.8
In general, the user-level characteristics of searches has remained relatively stable
across the two time periods, though with some notable dierence. For example, there
has been an increase in the incidence of 10-K or 10-Q, 8-K, S-1, comment letter, 13-F,
6-K, and 20-F downloads. These patterns are consistent with EDGAR users on average
downloading more information in the post 2008 period in a given daily session. In contrast,
there was heightened demand for proxy statements and insider lings in the pre-2008
period relative to the post-2008 sample, which could be in part explained by the eect of
governance failures and Sarbanes-Oxley. Overall, we conclude that the patterns observed
in the updated vintage of the EDGAR search data do not exhibit any systematic biases
or errors that raise concerns about their integrity.
2.2. Updated robot rule
One of the updates we make here to LMW is the methodology used in identifying and
ltering out search trac generated by automated scripts (\robots"), written to download
form of missing data is not likely to introduce a systematic bias, but would reduce the power of our
approach.
8For example, http://www.incapsula.com/blog/bot-traffic-report-2013 reports that in 2013,
60% of website visits are robot-generated. This number represented a 21% increase from 2012, when
51% of all website visits are made by robots.The Search for Benchmarks 9
massive numbers of lings. We expect such search trac to be uninformative and thus
devise algorithms to lter them out. LMW used an absolute cuto that classies all
daily IPs downloading more than 50 unique CIKs as a robot, a cuto that corresponded
to the 95th percentile of user search activity in the 2008 to 2011 sample. Given the
longer time series in our updated search data, in lieu of an absolute cuto, we now use
a robot identication strategy that classies any daily user downloading more than the
95th percentile in the distribution of unique CIK's within the corresponding calendar
year as a robot.9 As reported in Panel A of Table 1, keeping the trac from daily IP
addresses that searched for at least 2 unique CIKs' fundamentals | which we require
for the co-search algorithm we describe below | and less than the 95th percentile of the
unique CIKs downloaded in that year reduces our sample from 3.72 billion (56.2 million)
to 351.45 million daily pageviews (16.63 daily unique visitors).
2.3. Updated co-search algorithm and evidence on benchmarking
We infer investors' perceptions of relevant economic benchmarks by aggregating infor-
mation from their fundamental information acquisition behavior. Under the assumption
that the population of EDGAR users is collectively searching for rm fundamentals to aid
their investment decisions, and that an important part of this process involves the com-
parison of these fundamentals to economically related benchmarks, we expect EDGAR
users search sequences to be informative of their perceptions of the most relevant set of
benchmark rms.
Empirically we observe evidence consistent with EDGAR users acquiring information
on EDGAR for benchmarking purposes. For example, the average daily-user on EDGAR
downloads information for two rms. Figure 1 shows additionally that, among those
EDGAR users searching for information of more than one rm, a vast majority are
9A technicality to note here is that we use the 95th percentile in the raw daily-user population. On
the other hand, LMW identied the 50 CIK rule on the basis of the 95th percentile in the distribution
of daily-users that looked for information of at least two unique CIKs on EDGAR.The Search for Benchmarks 10
downloading the fundamentals of between two to ve rms, consistent with benchmarking.
Benchmarking behavior can also be seen in other search sequence characteristics.
Table 2 summarizes search sequence composition characteristics, conditional on having
accessed a particular rm's ling type and accessing information for more than one rm.
The rst row shows that, when an investor has accessed one rm's 10-K or 10-Q, 44.84%
of the remainder of her searches in the same session are for other rms' 10-K or 10-Qs.
In contrast, a substantially smaller proportion of the remaining searches are for 8-Ks,
comment letters, insider lings, proxies, S-1s, and other lings. The remaining rows show
that when investors access non-10-K and non-10-Q other forms, they tend to co-search
across a variety of forms of other rms. The substantially greater coincidence of 10-K
and 10-Q searches across dierent rms suggests that benchmarking behavior is likely to
be most pronounced among search sequences that access 10-Ks and 10-Qs.
Following this observation, we restrict our analysis to searches for 10-Ks and 10-Qs |
including their amendments or small business variants | to focus on investors' patterns
of acquiring fundamental information that most likely captures benchmarking behavior.
The nal ltered sample, as reported in row 4 in Panel A of Table 1, contains just over
115 million pageviews from 10.96 million daily users.
Using this ltered data, we extract the set of most relevant economic benchmarks to
any particular rm i by dening Annual search fraction, ft
ij, between the base rm i and
a peer rm j in calendar year t:
f
t
ij =
365
d=1(Unique daily-user searches for i and j)d
365
d=1(Unique daily-user searches for i and any rm j 6= i)d
: (1)
In words, ft
ij is the fraction of unique daily-users searching for rm i's and another
rm's information in a calendar year that also searched for j's information. This is a
more generalized version of the co-search algorithm employed in LMW, which dened
co-searches based on chronologically sequential clicks. For example, if a user clicks onThe Search for Benchmarks 11
Google and then Yahoo, Yahoo is considered a peer of Google, but not vice versa. The
co-search algorithm used in this study relaxes these chronological ordering restrictions,
and consider rms i and j to be benchmarks for each other, so long as they are co-searched
together by the same user within the same daily calendar EDGAR session window. In
other words, we are building a network of rms with weighted undirected edges dened
through co-searches, which is reasonable under the assumption that investors do not
search for information of benchmarks in any particular systematic order.
Our Annual search fraction measure sums to one for each rm in a given year, and is
easy to interpret. For example, f2008
GOOGLE;Y HOO=0:0602 means that 6:02% of daily-users
searching for Google's fundamental information and at least one other rm in calendar
year 2008, also searched for Yahoo's information. By construction, we do not use any
information from users who only search for a singular rm's lings before leaving the
EDGAR website.
Based on this measure, we dene a given base rm's top 10 SBPs in a given calendar
year as those peer rms with the ten highest values of Annual search fraction in the
preceding calendar year. The analyses of this paper focuses on the set of base rms that
belong to the S&P1500 index as of January 1 of each calendar year; however, no such
restrictions are placed on the set of benchmark rms.10 Panel B of Table 1 summarizes
the coverage of base rms with valid SBPs in our nal sample as well as the median
number of SBPs per rm by year. Again, all our analyses below focus on the top ten
SBPs of base rms.
2.4. Price co-movement
We now turn to investigate the performance of SBPs over the ten-year period from
2004 to 2013. Note that although we have only search trac data from 2003 to 2011, we
extend the 2012 SBPs derived from calendar year 2011 search trac by one more year to
10Previously in LMW, peer rms were restricted to be within the same S&P1500 universe as base
rms.The Search for Benchmarks 12
create SBPs for 2013, thus completing a ten-year sample.
Following LMW, our tests compare GICS6 and SBPs in their abilities to explain
the cross-sectional variation in base rms' monthly stock returns and rm fundamentals.
The intuition for these tests is that peer rms that are more economically related to their
base rms should exhibit greater contemporaneous correlation with them in returns and
in various accounting fundamentals.11
In Table 3, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression, for every month from
2004 to 2013:
Ri;t = t + tRpi;t + i;t; (2)
where Ri;t is the CRSP monthly cum-dividend return for each base rm i, taken from the
CRSP monthly les, and Rpi;t is the average monthly returns for a portfolio of benchmark
rms specic to base rm i. We assess the relative performance between GICS6 and
SBPs by comparing the average R2 produced by monthly regressions using benchmark
portfolios of all rms (excluding the base rm) selected from the base rms' GICS6
industries versus the average R2 produced by portfolios of the base rms' top 10 SBPs.
To avoid contamination from simultaneity of information, our SBPs are always identied
using search trac from the prior calendar year. For example, the Annual search fraction
measure ft
ij used to identify SBPs in calendar year 2009 are computed using calendar
year 2008 data. Thus, we estimate cross-sectional regressions of Eq.(2) for every month
from 2004 to 2013 and obtain an average R2 based on the 120 regressions.
We consider two types of peer portfolios using SBPs. The rst type of peer portfolio,
denoted \SBP EW," takes the closest 10 peer rms as implied by our Annual Search
Fraction measure and forms an equally weighted portfolio. The second type of peer
portfolio, denoted \SBP TW" (trac-weighted), takes the closest 10 rms as implied
through our Annual search fraction measure but forms a weighted average portfolio, where
11See LMW as well as Lewellen and Metrick (2010) for detailed discussions on the mapping between
higher R2 and greater fundamental similarity between base and benchmark rms.The Search for Benchmarks 13
a rm's portfolio weight is the Annual search fraction measures rescaled to sum to one.
To facilitate comparisons, all the regressions are conducted using the same underlying set
of base rms, so that our analyses include only base rms with sucient data from both
GICS and SBPs.
Table 3 reports the average R2 values from monthly regressions of Eq.(2), using base
rms from the S&P1500 and the S&P500. Our results show that SBP portfolios sig-
nicantly outperform GICS6 peer portfolios over the 10-year period.12 For the group
of S&P1500 base rms, their GICS6 peer portfolios explain, on average, 10.2% of the
cross-sectional variation in monthly returns, signicantly lower than the 12.8% (14.1%)
explained by their SBP EW (TW) portfolios. Similarly, for the set of S&P500 base rms,
their GICS6 peer portfolios explain, on average, 15.2% of the cross-sectional variation
in monthly returns, again signicantly lower than the 21.2% (23.6%) explained by their
SBP EW (TW) portfolios. Finally, we also observe the out-performance of SBPs among
the S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600 rms (collectively labeled as \S&P1000").
2.5. Co-movement in valuation multiples, nancial ratios, and other char-
acteristics
We also assess the extent to which SBPs explain the cross-section of base rms' valua-
tion multiples, nancial ratios, and key accounting measures. To perform these additional
tests, we gather quarterly data from Compustat and Institutional Brokers' Estimate Sys-
tem (IBES) on a range of valuation multiples, nancial ratios, and other fundamental
characteristics, including the price-to-book multiples (pb), enterprise value-to-sales multi-
ples (evs), price-to-earnings multiples (pe), returns on net operating assets (rnoa), returns
on equity (roe), asset turnover (at), prot margins (pm), leverage (lev), long-term an-
alyst growth forecasts (ltgrowth), one-year-ahead realized sales growth (salesgrowth),
12Unlike LMW, who formed GICS6 portfolios using 10 random GICS6 peers, we use all available
GICS6 rms outside of the base rm. We choose this in part to better reect GICS6 xed eects, but
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and research and development expenses scaled by net sales (rdpersales). The exact com-
putation of these variables (as well as all others used in this paper) are detailed in Table
A2.
With each of these variables, we run the analogous cross-sectional regression,
V ariablei;t = at + tV ariablepi;t + i;t; (3)
where V ariablei;t is the variable of interest for each base rm i and the regressor V ariablepi;t
is the portfolio mean value for i, based on either other rms belonging to the same GICS6
group or one of our two trac-based measures (SBP EW and SBP TW). We estimate
these regressions on a quarterly basis, at the end of March, June, September, and Decem-
ber of each calendar year from 2004 to 2013. The relevant variables are computed using
nancials that are available at the end of each quarter.13 Similarly, we obtain the most
up-to-date median long-term analyst forecasts from IBES at the end of each calendar
quarter.
Following Bhojraj et al. (2003), for the entire rm quarter{year sample, we drop
observations that are missing data on total assets, long-term debt, net income before
extraordinary items, debt in current liabilities, or operating income after depreciation. We
also drop observations with negative common or total equity and keep only observations
with net sales exceeding $100 million and a share price greater than $3 at the end of the
scal quarter. Finally, to mitigate the inuence of outliers, we truncate observations at
the rst and 99th percentiles for each of the variables for each regression equation.14 In
addition, we require net income before extraordinary items to be positive and require non-
missing values for current liabilities, current assets, and property, plants, and equipment
in computing rnoa. To facilitate comparisons, all the regressions are conducted using the
same underlying set of base rms.
13To ensure that our valuation multiples reect publicly available accounting information, we use
Compustat data for which earnings have been ocially announced by the end of each quarter.
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Table 4 compares GICS6 and SBP portfolios and shows that SBP portfolios out-
perform the GICS6 peer portfolios for nearly all of the variables tested. Within the
S&P1500 base rm sample, reported in Panel A, the SBP EW portfolios explain a signi-
cantly greater proportion of the cross-sectional variations than the GICS6 peer portfolios
in all of the variables. We nd similar results among the subset of S&P500 and S&P1000
rms. Across both subsamples, SBP EW (SBP TW) portfolios explain a signicantly
greater proportion of the cross sectional variation for 10 of the 11 (all 11 of the) variables
examined, at the 10% or better level.
Overall, our results conrm and support the ndings of LMW that SBPs substantially
outperform GICS6 in terms of their ability to explain cross-sectional variations in stock
prices and key valuation multiples, nancial statement ratios, and other fundamental
characteristics. More importantly, the prior ndings which were established on the basis
of the three-year period from 2008 to 2010 were not a transient phenomenon, but represent
a systematic pattern over a 10 year period from 2004 to 2013. This evidence supports
the powerful idea of extracting latent information from market participants' information
acquisition patterns in identifying fundamentally-related rms.
3. Comparisons to alternative peer identication
schemes
Having rearmed the out-performance to GICS6, in this section we extend the anal-
yses above by comparing the performance of SBPs to a number of alternatives that col-
lectively represent the frontier of peer identication schemes proposed by both industry
and academia.The Search for Benchmarks 16
3.1. Google Finance and Capital IQ peers
We begin by comparing SBPs to the set of rm benchmarks on Google Finance and
Capital IQ. We assembled \GOOGLE" peers by downloading the \Related Firms" listed
on each rm's Google Finance page as of June 2014. Our understanding is that Google
generates the list through a proprietary algorithm, with FactSet Research's own propri-
etary industry classication as one of the inputs. We also download a June 2014 snapshot
of product market competitors from Capital IQ. Capital IQ collects the set of companies
that a given rm i considers to be its competitors (coded as \Named by Company"), as
self-disclosed in the company's SEC lings, the set of companies that considers rm i
a competitor (coded as \Named by Competitor"), as disclosed by their SEC lings, and
nally the set of rms considered to be rm i's competitors as disclosed in third party
rms' SEC lings (coded as\Named by Third Party"). We dene a rm's\CIQ"peers to
be those competitors who are\Named by Company"or\Named by Competitor,"similar
to Rauh and Su (2012) and Lewellen (2013).
Panel A of Table 5 reports summary statistics of the alternative peers that we col-
lected. We have GOOGLE and CIQ peers for 1,088 and 1,160 base rms, respectively.
On average, each base rm has 7.69 GOOGLE peers and 5.13 CIQ peers. Finally, on
average 69% of GOOGLE peers belong to the same GICS6 industry as the base rms,
whereas 59% of CIQ peers belong to the same GICS6 as the base rms. Panel B shows
that there's a substantially higher correspondence between a base rm's top 10 SBPs
and its GOOGLE peers compared to the correspondence with CIQ peers. 62% of the
top-ranked SBPs are also a GOOGLE peer; in contrast, only 22% of top-ranked SBPs
are also a CIQ peer. Panel B also reveals a fast decay in this correspondence for both
GOOGLE and CIQ peers: only 17% (7%) of the 10th-ranked SBPs are also GOOGLE
(CIQ) peers. These summary statistics suggest that while there is some level of similarity
between SBPs and GOOGLE or CIQ peers, there are also substantial dierences betweenThe Search for Benchmarks 17
them.
Table 6 compares each of the alternative peer identication schemes to SBPs in terms
of its performance in explaining the cross-sectional variation in base rms' returns. The
tests follow the same estimation specications, i.e. Eq.(2), and requirements as in Table
3: for example, comparisons between SBPs and an alternative scheme are performed
based on the base-rm-month observations for which we have data on peers through the
alternative scheme and also data on SBPs. Unlike our baseline tests in Table 3, however,
we do not have 10 years' worth of valid peer data for all the alternative schemes. Since
both GOOGLE and CIQ peers represent June 2014 snapshots, we have limited ability
to assess their performance over time. Thus, we make a conservative assumption in our
tests that the peers from these schemes are valid in the 24 months from January of 2012
to December of 2013.15
Panel A1 of Table 6 shows that both equal-weighted and trac-weighted portfolios of
SBPs signicantly outperform both equal-weighted portfolios of GOOGLE and CIQ peers
in explaining the cross-sectional variation in the monthly returns of S&P1500 base rms.
The out-performance is both statistically and economically signicant. For example,
SBP TW portfolios outperform GOOGLE peers by 52% and CIQ peers by 277%, both
of which are signicant at the 1% level. Panels B1 and C1 of the same table show that
SBPs consistently outperform these alternatives across large base rms that belong to
the S&P500 and the smaller base rms that belong to the S&P MidCap 400 and S&P
SmallCap 600 (collectively denoted S&P1000 in this paper).16 Interestingly, while SBPs'
15To the extent that these assumptions create biases, we expect them to be in the direction favoring
these alternative schemes, since we are using base rms' future benchmarks to capture co-movements in
future performance. Our sense, however, is that benchmarks produced from various sources tend to be
fairly sticky over time, and we do not expect there to be signicant variation in a two-year span.
16We also considered value-weighted GOOGLE peer portfolios. Google Finance reports a rank ordering
of peers based on some proprietary algorithm; our value-weighted portfolio weights each peer rm based
on the order in which it appears in Google Finance's listing of \Related Firms." For example, the rm
that is reported rst out of ten will receive the weight of 10 P10
i=1 i = 2
11. In unreported results, we nd
that taking into account the relative rank improves the performance of GOOGLE peers only marginally.
Both SBP EW and SBP TW continue to signicantly outperform both economically and statistically.
We only consider equal-weighted portfolios for CIQ peers since there is no meaningful ranking that we
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out-performance over GOOGLE peers tends to be larger for smaller base rms, its out-
performance over CIQ base rms tends to be larger for larger base rms.
These results may reect potential biases embedded in the alternative classication
schemes. For example, the disclosure of competitive peers in SEC lings is a voluntary
choice and may be driven by strategic considerations. A large rm that views itself as a
stand-alone leader in a market may not view|thus name|any specic companies as a
competitor; a newcomer to a market, on the other hand, may name the market leaders as
its competitors aspirationally. This can potentially explain why CIQ performs especially
poorly relative to SBPs and why this out-performance is greater among the larger base
rms. Another possibility explaining GOOGLE and CIQ peers' performance may be their
relative paucity. As explained in the preceding section, benchmark portfolios consisting of
fewer rms are more exposed to peer rms' idiosyncratic shocks, which reduces the peer
portfolios' abilities to explain variations in base rms' returns. Finally, our ndings here
may reect SBPs' incorporating other, possibly more nuanced, dimensions of fundamental
similarity.
3.2. Text Network Industry Classication peers
We also consider peers belonging to the same\Text Network Industry Classication"
(TNIC). This classication scheme, developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010) and Hoberg
and Phillips (2014), infer product market peers and group rms into dierent\industry"
groupings by analyzing and quantifying textual similarities in rms' self-reported business
descriptions in their 10-K lings.
Data on TNIC peers are obtained from the Hoberg and Phillips Data Library online.17
Because TNIC is based on 10-K data, we assume that TNIC peers from scal year t are
usable for out-of-sample tests from July of t + 1 to June of t + 2. Overall, we collected
data on TNIC peers for 1,465 unique base rms from January 2004 to June of 2013. Panel
17We downloaded the July, 2013 version from http://alex2.umd.edu/industrydata/
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A, Table 5 also reports that, on average, each base rm has 79 TNIC peers and that, on
average, 48% of them belong to the same GICS6 as the base rm. Moreover, Panel B
shows a substantial correspondence between a base rm's top 10 SBPs and its TNIC peers:
whereas 73% of top-ranked SBPs are also a base rm's TNIC peers, this correspondence
diminishes to 43% for the 10th-ranked SBPs. Given the substantially larger size in TNIC
peers, relative to SBPs as well as GOOGLE and CIQ, it is not surprising that SBPs'
correspondence to TNIC is also substantially larger compared to the smaller alternative
schemes.
Panel A2, Table 6 shows that both equal-weighted portfolios of SBPs and a trac-
weighted portfolios of SBPs signicantly outperform equal-weighted portfolios of TNIC
peers in explaining the cross-sectional variation in the monthly returns of S&P1500 base
rms in the 114 months from January 2004 to June 2013. Whereas SBP EW outperforms
TNIC by 71%, SBP TW outperforms TNIC by 88%, both statistically signicant at the
1% level. Panels B2 and C2 of the table conrm that this out-performance is consistent
across the large and small base rms. Interestingly, SBPs' out-performance of TNIC
peers is stronger among the larger base rms.
While we view TNIC as being an innovative method for classifying rms belonging to
similar competitive spheres, we conjecture that its performance in explaining the cross-
sectional variations in prices and fundamentals may be a result of the relatively large
number of rms belonging to a given TNIC \industry," which hampers the ability of the
TNIC peer portfolio to capture economic similarities with the base rm. However, it is
possible that the performance of TNIC benchmark portfolios could improve using the
closest peers in terms of their textual distance to the base rm.
3.3. Yahoo! Finance and analyst co-coverage peers
Our evidence thus far highlights the possibility that SBPs' performance stems from
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investors in identifying fundamentally similar rms for benchmarking purposes. To the
extent that this is a primary driver for SBPs' out-performance, we believe this powerful
concept can be illustrated, extended, and exploited in dierent contexts. We do so by
considering two peer identication schemes that also aim to capture the collective wisdom
of investors.
We rst consider the set of co-search-based peers available on Yahoo! Finance (hence-
forth YHOO peers). Yahoo Finance makes available to users the set of rms which
also viewed the base rm: for example, when searching for Google's information Yahoo
Finance reports \People viewing GOOG also viewed PCLN AMZN BIDU AAPL MA
NFLX." We collected YHOO peers in June 2014 for a total of 922 unique base rms.18
As we report in Panel A, Table 5, each base rm has on average 5 YHOO peers, with
28% of them on average sharing the same GICS6 as the base rm. Panel B shows that
with the exception of the top-ranked SBP, there is on average fairly low correspondence,
thus substantial dierences, between SBPs and YHOO peers.
Like GOOGLE and CIQ peers, YHOO peers represents a snapshot from June, 2014,
limiting our ability to assess their performance over time. Consistent with CIQ and
GOOGLE peers, we make a conservative assumption in our tests that YHOO peers are
valid in the 24 months from January of 2012 to December of 2013. Panel A3, Table 6
shows that both equal-weighted portfolios of SBPs and a trac-weighted portfolios of
SBPs signicantly outperform equal-weighted portfolios of YHOO peers in explaining
the cross-sectional variation in the monthly returns of S&P1500 base rms from 2012 to
2013. Whereas SBP EW outperforms YHOO by 136%, SBP TW outperforms YHOO
by 165%, both statistically signicant at the 1% level. Panels B1 and C1 of the table
conrm that this out-performance is consistent across both large and small base rms.
Strikingly, SBPs' out-performance of YHOO peers is much stronger among the smaller
18Note that Yahoo displays the co-searched tickers on a randomized basis per page refresh- consistent
with the issue highlighted in Kremer et al. (2014) that full transparency is inecient due to reduced
incentives to provide novel information. Our algorithm refreshes the page until Yahoo displays the
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base rms. For example, whereas SBP EW (TW) outperforms YHOO by 22% (42%)
among the S&P500 base rms, this out-performance expands to 177% (205%) among the
S&P1000 base rms.
These results are revealing of the potential conditions under which the\collective wis-
dom"of investors are likely to be useful in producing fundamentally similar benchmarks.
In the absence of total visibility into the underlying data and Yahoo's algorithms, our
conjecture is that search trac on Yahoo! Finance is driven more by retail investors. If
so, we expect their trac to be more concentrated around large and salient rms and
we expect them to be less sophisticated than EDGAR users. These factors could explain
our joint ndings that 1) SBPs outperform YHOO peers and 2) the out-performance is
greater among smaller base rms. Thus, the usefulness and power stemming from the
\collective wisdom"critically depends on the level of sophistication of investors underlying
the search trac.19
Whereas SBPs implicitly harness the collective wisdom of investors on EDGAR, we
further illustrate the power of this idea by examining the collective wisdom of sell-side
analysts. Theoretically, analysts have an incentive to cover economically similar rms
because of the reduced cost of information acquisition (e.g., Peng and Xiong, 2006).
Empirically, research has shown that sell side analysts tend to specialize in industries and
cover multiple rms belonging to her primary industry of expertise (e.g., Liang et al.,
2008). On the other hand, there can be various other factors | for example, relating to
the analysts' incentives or brokerage house characteristics | that drive analysts' coverage
decisions. Liang et al. (2008) documents that analysts are more likely to cover a rm
based on reasons idiosyncratic to the brokerage house: when the brokerage house has had
19The role of user sophistication may also help rationalize literature ndings in the aggregated wisdom
of stock opinions. Antweiler and Frank (2004) aggregate Yahoo and Raging Bull's message board chats
to study dispersion of beliefs and stock volatility. They also nd an economically small eect in the
aggregated messages' tone's ability to predict future returns. In contrast, Chen et al. (2014) nd that
aggregated tone from articles on Seeking Alpha helps predict earning surprises and subsequent stock
returns, with economically signicant magnitudes. A factor which reconciles their ndings may be the
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a recent investment banking relationship with the rm;20 or when the rm was previously
followed by another analyst employed in but who is no longer forecasting for the same
brokerage house. Liang et al. (2008) also document the possibility that there may be
systematic biases in analysts' coverage decisions: for example, analysts are more likely
to cover high growth rms. Thus, while analysts' coverage decisions are in part driven
by fundamental similarities between rms and in part due to non-fundamentals-related
factors, our thesis is that, like patterns of co-search for rm fundamentals, aggregate
patterns of analysts' co-coverage decisions can be informative of fundamental similarities
between rms.21
To construct analyst co-coverage of rms, we obtain IBES forecast le covering the
universe of analyst EPS forecasts for the period 2003-2013. To qualify as an analyst
covering rm i, the analyst must have made at least one forecast for the rm in the
calendar year. We then apply the same logic of our co-search algorithm and generate an
analyst co-coverage fraction between rms i and j in year t:
Analyst co-coverage fractionijt =
# of analysts who co-cover i and j
# of analysts who cover i
: (4)
This fraction is dened as the percentage of analysts covering i who also cover j. Note
that an analyst is dened as the unique combination of the broker and analyst ID from
IBES such that an analyst who moves from one broker to another would be treated as a
dierent analyst in our sample.
Based on Analyst co-coverage fraction, we consider two types of analyst co-coverage
peers (ACPs). First, we consider all peers that are co-covered, and second, we consider
only the top 10 ACPs, the same as our treatment of SBPs. Table 5 reports that there are
valid ACPs for 1,291 unique base rms in 2013. On average, each base rm has 94 ACPs,
20However, this eect diminishes after Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2000.
21The idea of identifying related rms based on analysts' coverage choices have been explored in the
works of Ramnath (2002), Israelsen (2014), Kaustia and Rantala (2013), and Muslu et al. (2014).The Search for Benchmarks 23
and 39% of these ACPs share the same GICS6 as the base rm. Moreover, Panel B of
the table suggests that a fairly high percentage of SBPs are also ACPs. As with TNIC
peers, this reects the relatively numerous ACPs. When we consider the top 10 ACPs,
the correspondence with SBPs declines substantially. While 63% of the top-ranked SBPs
are also top 10 ACPs, only 19% of the 10th-ranked SBPs belong to the top 10 ACPs.
Thus there is also substantial disagreement between SBPs and ACPs in terms of which
peer rms are the most related to the base rm.
The last 4 rows in Panel A3 of Table 6 compare the performance of ACPs in explaining
the cross-sectional variation in base rms' monthly returns from January 2004 to Decem-
ber 2013. The second and fourth rows of Panel A3 consider equal-weighted [EW] ACP
portfolios consisting of all ACPs and top 10 ACPs, respectively; the third and fth rows
consider value-weighted [VW] ACP portfolios consisting of all ACPs and top 10 ACPs,
respectively, weighting each ACP by the relative magnitude of its Analyst co-coverage
fraction.
Our results suggest that the collective wisdom gleaned from analysts' co-coverage pat-
terns produce peers that perform substantially better relative to the other alternatives.
The EW and VW portfolios of all ACPs explain 10.2% and 11.6%, respectively, of base
rms' monthly returns. Restricting these portfolios to the top 10 ACPs improves the
performance substantially, explaining 12.1% and 12.6% of base rms' monthly returns,
respectively. Moreover, it's interesting to observe that, similar to our Annual search
fraction measure, weighting by the relative magnitudes of Analyst co-coverage fraction
improves the performance of peer portfolios, consistent with co-coverage patterns con-
taining information about underlying rm relations.
While the performance statistics of ACPs approach those of SBPs, SBPs continue
to outperform each of the four ACP portfolios considered. In particular, our SBP TW
portfolios explain 13% of base rms' monthly returns, an out-performance of 41% and
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of 19% and 14% over the EW and VW portfolios of top 10 ACPs.
3.4. Accounting fundamentals tests
We extend the above comparisons to alternative peer identication schemes by exam-
ining their performance in explaining the cross-sectional variation in rm fundamentals,
following the analyses and tests of Table 4. Table 7 shows that SBPs also outperform the
alternative peer schemes in explaining the cross-sectional variation in a variety of rm
fundamentals.
For 9 of the 11 of the fundamental measures considered, SBP EW portfolios out-
perform equal-weighted portfolios of GOOGLE peers signicantly at the 1% level, with
a median out-performance of 44%. SBP EW portfolios also outperform equal-weighted
portfolios of CIQ and TNIC peers signicantly, at the 1% level, for 10 of 11 and 11 of 11
of the measures considered, and a median out-performance of 127% and 39% respectively.
SBPs also compare favorably against YHOO peers as well as ACPs. For all 11 mea-
sures considered, SBP EW portfolios outperform YHOO peer portfolios signicantly at
the 1% level, with a median out-performance of 81%. Similar to the price co-movement
tests, the equal- and value-weighted portfolios consisting of top 10 ACPs perform the
best. Out of the 11 fundamental variables considered, SBP EW (TW) peer portfolios
outperform Top 10 Co-Coverage EW (VW) in 7 (9) at the 5% level, with SBPs' median
out-performance of 13% (14%) in the cross sectional variation in base rms' fundamentals.
Together, these ndings show that EDGAR users in aggregate are able identify a set
of economically-related rms, and this collective wisdom of investors is incremental to
existing alternative peer identication schemes. Across our cross sectional tests involving
returns, valuation multiples, nancial statement ratios, and other fundamental charac-
teristics, SBPs in the aggregate do a better job explaining their cross sectional variation
relative to the alternative peer schemes.The Search for Benchmarks 25
3.5. Discussion of the relative performance of revealed-choice-based meth-
ods
Though ACPs do not overall perform as well as SBPs in these tests, we view their good
performance relative to the alternative peer identication schemes as further evidence of
the idea that harnessing the\collective wisdom"of market participants is a powerful way
to identify economically-related rms. In the case of ACPs, while an individual analyst's
choice of rms to cover may have idiosyncrasies, the collective co-coverage patterns across
analysts reect underlying structure in the fundamental relations between rms.
In the Appendix, we propose a simple model to provide further intuition for why, and
under what circumstances, aggregate co-search decisions by investors (the model also
applies to co-coverage decisions by analysts) can be expected to uncover the underlying
fundamental similarities between rms. This model is anchored on the assumptions that
investors, who intend to make an investment decision for some base rm, are performing
benchmarking analyses to put the base rm's fundamentals in context. For simplicity,
and consistent with the empirical evidence that on average EDGAR users search for the
fundamentals of 2 rms, we assume that investors co-search for the information of one
benchmark based on her private signals of candidate rms' fundamental similarities with
the base rm.
This model makes three intuitive predictions. First, all else equal, search fractions
are more \informative" | i.e., of the rank ordering of benchmarking rms based on fun-
damental similarities with the base rm | when there are more investors independently
searching. Second, search fractions are less informative when investors have noisier signals
for the fundamental similarities between rms, or when there is a relatively small number
of investors independently searching. Three, investors' systematic biases can corrupt the
informativeness of co-search fractions, even when there are a large number of investors
searching for information. However, when such biases are well-behaved, i.e., preserve theThe Search for Benchmarks 26
true order of the fundamental similarities between rms, co-search fractions will continue
to be informative. These predictions can be easily extended to the analyst co-coverage
context.
The relative performance of SBPs, ACPs, and YHOO peers are consistent with the
predictions of this simple model. For example, the nding that YHOO peers perform
especially poorly among small rms is consistent with the model if retail investors do
indeed perform fewer searches of small rms' fundamental information on Yahoo Finance,
thus reducing the informativeness of YHOO co-search fractions. Moreover, the fact that
ACPs perform so well, and YHOO peers do not, is also consistent with the model's
predictions that the properties of investors' collective biases inuences the informativeness
of co-search (or co-coverage) fractions. This evidence supports our conjecture that the
usefulness and power stemming from the\collective wisdom"critically depends on the level
of sophistication of market participants underlying the relevant decision context. Loosely
speaking, the level of sophistication determines the collective size and the properties
of investors' biases in our model; the less sophisticated the investors, the more likely
that systematic biases are order-preserving and less likely that co-search (or co-coverage)
fractions are informative of fundamental similarities between rms. Whereas YHOO
peers are likely generated or inuenced by a disproportionate number of retail investors,
analyst co-coverage patterns reect revealed decisions of relatively more sophisticated
(though perhaps still biased) sell-side stock analysts.
Finally, though conceptually similar, the set of investors that generate EDGAR search
trac and their information sets may be quite dierent from the set of analysts that
generate ACPs. Our results above also suggest that SBPs and ACPs produce signicantly
dierent results, perhaps resulting from the dierent size, information sets, incentives, and
biases represented by these two pools of market participants.The Search for Benchmarks 27
4. Exploring dierences between SBPs and ACPs
In this section we explore the similarities and the dierences in the two best-performing
peer identication approaches from the preceding section: SBPs and ACPs, representing
the collective wisdoms of EDGAR users and sell-side analysts respectively.
4.1. Characteristics of base rms and SBP-ACP disagreement
We begin by exploring the extent to which agreements between SBPs and ACPs are
associated with the characteristics of the underlying base rm. To explore if agreement
between SBP and ACP is a function of the underlying base rm's characteristics, we
estimate the following specication:
Agree(SBP;ACP)i;t = 
0	i;t + i;t (5)
where the outcome variable is the degree of agreement between the top ten SBP and ACP
rms for a given base rm i in year t. Agree(SBP;ACP) ranges from 0 to 1, where 0
denotes no overlap between a rm's top 10 SBPs and top 10 ACPs and 1 denotes 100%
overlap.22 	i;t represents a vector of base rm characteristics including log size, pb, evs,
pe, rnoa, at, lev, salesgrowth, rdpersales, and complexity, where complexity is dened as
the number of base rm's operating segments with dierent SIC2 codes, following Cohen
and Lou (2012).
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A, Table 8 estimate Eq.(5) using OLS. Whereas column
1 includes all base rms in our sample from the S&P 1500 that have ACPs and SBPs,
column 2 focuses on the subsample of rms with non-missing values for ltgrowth, eps
spread, and ltgrowth spread.
The estimates in column 1 indicate that there is more disagreement between SBPs
22However, the rank ordering of the peers need not be identical across the two peer identication
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and ACPs among rms with base rms that are smaller (lower log size), more glam-
orous (higher pe, higher evs, and lower rnoa), and more complex (higher complexity).
We perform a similar exercise in columns 3 and 5, but use log of Agree(SBP;ACP)it
as the dependent variable in an OLS specication and the number of agreed upon peers
between a rm's ACPs and SBPs in an ordered logistic model, respectively. These al-
ternative specications yield qualitatively identical results compared to the baseline OLS
specication of column 1.
The nding that there is a greater disagreement between SBPs and ACPs among
smaller rms is intuitive, as the information environment around smaller rms is less
certain. In the even columns of Panel A, Table 8, we include additional controls for base
rms' characteristics relating to analysts' forecasts: coverage, ltgrowth, eps spread, and
ltgrowth spread. In these specications, log size loses signicance and is replaced by a sig-
nicant coecient on coverage, again consistent with poorer information environment|
i.e., when there are fewer analysts covering the base rm| resulting in greater disagree-
ment between a base rm's SBPs and ACPs.
The nding that there is more disagreement between SBPs and ACPs among com-
plicated base rms is particularly interesting in conjunction with the nding that rms'
top 10 ACPs have a tighter correspondence with GICS6 than SBPs. If an analyst's cov-
erage portfolio decision is more anchored upon traditional industry classication schemes
(compared to EDGAR users' co-search decisions), the nding that SBPs disagree more
with ACPs among the set of more complicated base rms | for whom industry classi-
cation schemes are least appropriate (e.g., Cohen and Lou, 2012) | could be a possible
explanation for SBPs' out-performance of ACPs.
The nding that there is more disagreement between SBPs and ACPs among base
rms that are higher growth or more glamorous could reect systematic biases in ana-
lysts' preferences for covering such types of rms, which have been documented in prior
literature (e.g., Bhushan, 1989; Cowen et al., 2006; Irvine, 2000; Liang et al., 2008; Mc-The Search for Benchmarks 29
Nichols and O'Brien, 1997; Daniel et al., 2002). In other words, if analysts are biased
towards covering higher growth rms on the margin, we would capture these preferences
in the aggregate co-coverage patterns too. In untabulated results, we nd that ACPs on
average indeed command higher price multiples and receive higher long-term growth fore-
casts from analysts in comparison to SBPs. Such systematic biases in analysts' coverage
decisions could further explain SBPs' out-performance of ACPs.
4.2. Determinants of top SBPs and ACPs
To further understand the dierences between SBPs and ACPs, and potential biases
that may drive each peer identication scheme, we complement the above analyses by
examining the determinants of top SBPs and ACPs in a multivariate setting. In partic-
ular, we examine the relative importance of similarities in base-to-peer-rm fundamental
characteristics in determining the likelihood of a candidate peer rm being a top SBP or
ACP.
Our empirical approach begins with matching each base rm in the S&P1500 sample
to its top 10 SBPs and the set of alternative peer rms coming from each base rm's
GICS2 sector that are not already included in its top 10 SBPs. In an analogous sample,
we match each base rm to its top 10 ACPs and the set of alternative peer rms from each
base rm's GICS2 sector that are not already included in its top 10 ACPs. In each of these
samples, we compute, for each base-to-peer-rm pair, the absolute percentage dierence
(j
peer
base   1j) in each of the following fourteen characteristics: size, pb, pe, rnoa, roe, at,
evs, lev, salesgrowth, rdpersales, coverage, eps spread, ltgrowth, and ltgrowth spread.
Each of these dierences is then decile ranked within year in order to reduce the inuence
of outliers in estimation: higher decile values correspond to greater absolute percentage
dierences in the relevant characteristic between the base and peer rm relative to other
base-peer pairs in the cross section. We also dene a dummy variable, supply chain, that
equals 1 if the base-peer pair are supply chain partners, following the procedure in CohenThe Search for Benchmarks 30
and Frazzini (2008).23 Finally, we dene a dummy variable, Dierent GICS4, that equals
1 if the base rm and the peer rm belong to dierent GICS4 industry groups.
Using pooled probit models, we estimate the likelihood that a candidate peer rm is
a top 10 SBP or ACP as a function of dierences in fundamental characteristics and year
xed eects. Table 9 reports the estimated marginal eects for the S&P1500 base rm
sample: with the exception of Supply Chain, Dierent GICS4, and the year xed eects,
which are all evaluated at 0, all other marginal eects are evaluated at 1. Following the
format of Table 8, even columns include only base and peer rms that have valid data
for coverage, ltgrowth, eps spread, and ltgrowth spread, a restriction that substantially
attenuates the set of candidate peers.
Overall the various specications in Table 9 paint a consistent picture illustrating key
dierences between the determinants of SBPs and ACPs. Relative to potential peer rms
in the same GICS2 sector, a rm is more likely to be a top 10 SBP or ACP when it is more
similar to the base rm in fundamental characteristics. With the exception of size and
pb, all decile ranked percent dierences in fundamental characteristics are negative and
signicant at the 1% level in all specications, consistent with SBPs and ACPs capturing
a set of peer rms that are fundamentally more similar to the base rm of interest.24
These results also capture potential biases in how each scheme aggregates the \col-
lective wisdom" of market participants. First, greater dierences in size increase the
likelihood of a peer rm being a top 10 SBP or ACP. In un-tabulated summary statistics,
we nd that indeed both ACPs and SBPs are on average larger than their base rms in
market capitalization. These ndings are consistent with the possibility that: 1) EDGAR
users have a systematic tendency to benchmark to larger rms, which is not surprising
if larger and salient rms inuence investors' search behaviors; and 2) analysts have a
23In particular we use the Compustat customer-supplier database identify customer-supplier links at
the yearly level.
24Though the coecients on decile ranks of dierences in pb are statistically signicant, they are
economically negligible. For example, column 2 (4) suggests that a peer rm in the 10th decile in the
percent dierence in price-to-book multiple has a 0.6% (0.9%) greater likelihood of being a base rm's
top 10 SBP (ACP) compared to a peer rm in the 1st decile of price-to-book dierence, all else equal.The Search for Benchmarks 31
tendency to cover large blue chip rms within a certain industry, all else equal, which is
not surprising given that such rms are expected to command the greatest institutional
ownership and interest (e.g., Bhushan, 1989). Thus, while both SBPs and ACPs exhibit a
similar bias in size, we conjecture that they are a result of dierent factors. Interestingly,
this size eect is stronger for SBPs, implying a greater propensity among EDGAR users
to co-search for or benchmark to larger rms: a peer rm in the 10th decile in the percent
dierence in market capitalization has a 6 percentage point greater likelihood of being a
base rm's top 10 SBP compared to a peer rm in the 1st decile of size dierence, all
else equal; in contrast, a peer rm in the 10th decile in the percent dierence in market
capitalization has a 2 percentage point greater likelihood of being a base rm's top 10
ACP compared to a peer rm in the 1st decile of size dierence, all else equal.
The results of Table 9 are also consistent with the view that there is a greater bias
towards high growth or glamour rms among ACPs. For example, the negative marginal
eects on the decile ranked dierences in pe, evs, and salesgrowth are smaller in magnitude
for explaining determinants of top ACPs relative to SBPs. For each of these variables,
going from the 1st decile to the 10th decile in percent dierence approximately reduces
the likelihood of being in a base rm's top 10 SBPs by approximately twice as much as
the reduction in the likelihood of being in a base rm's top 10 ACPs.
The most economically meaningful eects in Table 9 are captured by the dummy
variables Supply Chain and Dierent GICS4. In particular, SBPs are more likely to
capture supply chain partners relative to ACPs. Column 2 suggests that, all else equal,
being a supply chain partner to the base rm increases a rm's likelihood of being a top
10 SBP by 30 percentage points, all else equal; in contrast, being a supply chain partner
only increases the likelihood of being a top 10 ACP by 19 percentage points, all else equal.
Finally, we nd ACPs are much more anchored on GICS classications compared to
SBPs. Whereas being in a dierent GICS4 industry grouping reduces a candidate peer
rm's likelihood of being a top 10 SBP by about 8 percentage points, the eect on theThe Search for Benchmarks 32
likelihood of being a top 10 ACP is a reduction of 16 percentage points, all else equal.
Collectively the evidence presented here highlights that while both SBPs and ACPs in
general capture peer rms that are fundamentally similar to the base rm, each exhibits
its own unique biases. Whereas SBPs exhibits a slightly greater bias towards large rms
and are more likely to contain supply chain partners, ACPs tend to anchor more to GICS
industry groupings and have a greater bias towards high growth and glamour rms. These
observations can be reconciled with our ndings that SBPs tend to outperform ACPs
along multiple dimensions. The fact that SBPs are more likely to capture base rms'
supply chain partners can explain the greater ability of SBPs to explain cross-sectional
variations in returns and fundamentals; after all, many economic shocks can stem from
(and be captured by) the supply chain. Moreover, as explained in Cohen and Lou (2012)
and LMW, picking economically related rms for complex or conglomerate rms can be
particularly dicult using traditional classication schemes that, by default, organize
rms into mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive groupings. Thus the fact that
ACPs anchor more on GICS, combined with the nding that ACPs disagree with SBPs
more when the base rms are complex, can also explain SBPs' superior performance.
4.3. Performance of composite peers
We now turn to investigate the incremental information captured by the disagreements
between SBPs and ACPs. For example, despite the general superior performance of SBPs,
there may still be incremental information in ACPs missing in SBPs. In Table 10, we
investigate whether a hybrid approach that combines both set of revealed-choice-based
benchmarks is incremental to the stand-alone performance of SBPs. For brevity, we focus
on the price co-movement test from Eq2.
Column 3 of Panel A reports the R2 of the regression using the union of the set of top
10 SBPs and ACPs (\SBP[ACP") while column 1 replicates the baseline SBP results.
Across both the S&P1500 base 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and the S&P1000 subsample of smaller base rms, we nd that the union of the peer
sets modestly outperform the standalone SBP grouping, ranging from a 3.6% to 10.3%
improvement in column 5. In particular, the incremental improvement is greater among
the smaller rms.
In lieu of the union, we also investigate the alternative composite group formed using
the intersection of the two groupings (\SBP\ACP"). To perform the test, we restrict the
base rm sample to those rms with at least one top 10 SBP that is also in its top 10
ACPs.25 These results are reported in Panel B of the same table in column 2. Column 4
shows that SBPs that do not belong to this intersection provide signicant incremental
information, as the performance of SBP exceeds that of SBP\ACP by 27% (31%) for
the set of S&P1500 (S&P1000) base rms, again concentrated around smaller base rms.
Moreover, a comparison of\SBP[ACP"to SBP here again reveals a small but signicant
improvement in performance, ranging from 3% among S&P500 base rms to 8% among
the smaller S&P1000 base rms.
The ndings in this section provides a best-performing set of revealed-choice-based
benchmarks that combines the collective wisdom of EDGAR users and sell-side analysts.
Moreover, the nding that the improvements in the performance of composite peers over
SBPs are concentrated among the set of smaller base rms suggests that in poorer infor-
mation environments, there is a greater value in aggregating and combining the collective
wisdom gleaned from the behavior of dierent types of sophisticated market participants.
5. Conclusion
In an increasingly service- and knowledge-based economy characterized by quickly-
changing competitive landscapes, traditional industry classications are unlikely to cap-
25This reduces the average number of rms in each cross section from 1,311 to 1,199. Smaller base rms
disproportionately aected here, going from 899 to 785 rms on average, reecting greater disagreements
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ture nuanced or changing economics in rms. This paper argues that the class of bench-
marking solutions that harness the collective wisdom of investors is a promising path for
the future.
We provide evidence that SBPs, which aggregate EDGAR users' perceptions of fun-
damentally related benchmarks, not only systematically outperform peers derived from
standard industry classication schemes like the GICS over a ten-year period, but they
also outperform alternative state-of-the-art benchmarking solutions proposed by the aca-
demic literature and industry.
Strikingly, among the alternative schemes we considered, the next-best alternative
also represents a revealed-choice-based solution that embodies the collective wisdom of
sell-side analysts, gleaned from aggregate patterns of their co-coverage decisions. While
there is substantial overlap in the set of peer rms identied as SBPs and ACPs, we nd
greater disagreement between the two groups amongst both growth rms and complicated
rms. We also nd that ACPs are more anchored on GICS than SBPs, and exhibit a bias
towards higher growth rms. SBPs, on the other hand, are more likely to capture supply
chain partners of the base rm.
Collectively, the evidence put forth in this paper suggests that while these aggregated
revealed-choice-based approaches have great potential in resolving long-standing bench-
marking problems in accounting and nance. Future research that seeks to add to this
class of benchmarks should focus on areas where there is a critical mass of sophisticated
market participants, and where the market participants' collective actions are not likely to
exhibit collective biases unrelated to the fundamental relatedness between rms. Finally,
in poorer information environments, there are greater benets from combining the collec-
tive wisdom of dierent types of sophisticated market participants in identifying economic
benchmarks. We hope that the ndings of this paper stimulates further research in this
area.The Search for Benchmarks 35
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A Appendix: A simple model of aggregate co-search
A.1. Set up
A population of N investors are interested in making investor decisions for some base
rm 0 and individually searching for comparative rms to benchmark against rm 0's
performance. We assume that there are two potential candidate rms, 1 and 2, whose
fundamental similarity to rm 0 are characterized by d1 and d2, unobservable to investors.
Without loss of generality, d1 < d2 where a lower d implies greater similarity to the base
rm 0.
Each individual investor i receives private signals on the similarity between the base
rm and the candidate peer rms:
^ d1 = d1 + i;1 (A1)
^ d2 = d2 + i;2 (A2)
where (i;1;i;2)0 iid N(;). Here,  = (c1;c2) capture the collective biases that in-
vestors may have, and  captures the variance-covariance matrix of investor's idiosyn-
crasies, whose elements are assumed to be nite. Based on the private signals, investor i
makes one choice of a benchmarking rm to co-search.26
A.2. Co-search fraction and comparative statics
Under this model, investor i will pick rm 1 i ^ d1 < ^ d2, or equivalently i;1   i;2 <
d2   d1. Thus the probability of selecting rm 1 is 

(d2 d1) (c1 c2) p
2
1+2
2 212

, where  is the
CDF of a standard normal distribution, and (2
1;2
2;12) represent the variances of the
errors and their covariance, respectively.
As the sample of investors N ! 1, the fraction of investors that co-search funda-
mentals for rm 1 and 2 will be equal to the following co-search fractions:
f0;1 = 
 
(d2   d1)   (c1   c2)
p
2
1 + 2
2   212
!
; and (A3)
f0;2 = 1   
 
(d2   d1)   (c1   c2)
p
2
1 + 2
2   212
!
; respectively. (A4)
The following comparative statics are implied from the above:
@f0;1
@d2 > 0;
@f0;1
@c2 > 0;
@f0;1
@d1 <
0;
@f0;1
@c1 < 0; and sign(
@f0;1
@2
j ) =  sign(d2   d1)   (c1   c2))
26We limit this choice to simplify the model, but the assumption can also be thought to reect search
costs and consistent with the observed empirical fact that the modal number of rms for co-searching
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A.3. Empirical Evidence
We provide some suggestive evidence that the model's comparative statics on f0;1 are
consistent with the observed empirical search fraction. The model predicts that (assum-
ing order preserving biases) as the investor's signal precision worsens, the search fraction
should decrease. We can interpret the signal precision to be worse for smaller rms (with
poorer information environments) and for more complicated rms due to increased in-
vestor processing costs. Appendix Table 1 illustrates that the average search fraction of a
base rm's top 10 search-based peers (SBPs) is increasing in the size quantile of the base
rm and decreasing in the number of operating segments within the base rm, a measure
of complexity used in Cohen and Lou (2012). The number of base rm-year observations
per cell are reported in brackets underneath the average search fraction.
Appendix Table 1: Average search fraction by size and complexity groupings
Size Quantile Single Segment 2-3 Segments 4 Segments+
1 (smaller) 0.0167 0.0160 0.0146
[1,632] [950] [132]
2 0.0193 0.0171 0.0155
[1,463] [1,008] [165]
3 0.0205 0.0184 0.0161
[1,333] [1,110] [324]
4 0.0209 0.0193 0.0177
[1,304] [1,137] [324]
5 (bigger) 0.0219 0.0206 0.0177
[1,024] [1,135] [562]
A.4. Implications
The basic model generates three key implications.
Implication 1
The collective wisdom of investors reected in the aggregated co-search fraction f0;1 will
capture the correct rank ordering of the most fundamentally similar benchmarks d2 > d1
if and only if
(d2   d1)   (c1   c2)
p
2
1 + 2
2   212
> 0 or d2 + c2 > d1 + c1: (A5)
In other words, as long as investors' biases | e.g., from non-benchmarking behavior, in-
formational errors, or behavioral biases | are order preserving, in large sample, investors'
aggregated search fractions reveal the rank ordering of fundamental similarities between
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Implication 2
In nite samples with N investors, however, the number of investors that choose rm
1, the correct benchmark, is distributed Binomial(N,), and the observed nite sample
search fraction f0;1 has a sampling distribution with a mean of  and variance of
(1 )
N .
This implies that, under the assumption that biases are order-preserving, search fractions
are more informative when there are more investors searching.
This follows from the observation that at the limit, the sample search fraction ^ 
converges to . Under this condition, having more investors independently searching
(higher N) reduces sampling variation in the search fraction and increases its ability to
correctly reect the rank ordering of fundamental rm similarities.
Implication 3
Under the assumption that investors' biases are order preserving, the noisier are investors'
signals | e.g., due to poor information environments or lower investor sophistication |
the less informative are the sample co-search fractions. This follows from the observation
that the maximum sampling variation is obtained for (0) = 1
2. Thus increasing the
noisiness in investors' signals (i.e., increasing 2
1 or 2
2) tends to increase the sampling
variation in the sample co-search fraction ^ .The Search for Benchmarks 40
Table A1.
Comparison of SEC Trac Data Version Vintages
This table reports the means and dierence-in-means in observable user search behavior between the data
used in Lee, Ma, and Wang (2014) and the more recent data extract made available covering calendar years
2003-2011. Each observation represents a user dened at the daily-IP level. Panel A describes the com-
parison of the new data versus the LMW dataset for the data overlapping time period which spans 2008 to
2011. Panel B describes the comparison of the new data for the 2003-2007 and 2008-2011 sample periods.
The variables: Any \10-K or 10-Q", \Proxy", \Insider", etc are dummies which equals one if a daily-IP user
searched for the particular ling type on a given day. Number of Unique CIKs is the number of unique rms (CIK-based) a
user accessed on a daily level. Total Clicks is the raw number of clicks a user generated on a daily level. Number of Unique
Filing Types is a count of the total number of ling types (10-K, 10-Q, etc) a user accessed on a daily level. Number of
Unique File Extensions is a count of the total number of unique le extensions (.txt, .pdf, .html) a user accessed on a
daily level. Total Session Length is the estimated average time (in hours) a user actively accessed the EDGAR website.
Panel A: Daily-User Comparison Between New Data and LMW
New Data Lee, Ma, Wang (2014)   t-stat
Any 10-K or 10-Q 0.533 0.530 -0.002 -18.859
Any Proxy 0.116 0.118 0.002 27.530
Any Insider (3,4,5) 0.101 0.107 0.006 83.885
Any 8-K 0.281 0.282 0.001 10.485
Any S-1 0.091 0.091 0.001 8.004
Any Comment Letter 0.021 0.021 0.000 3.593
Any 13-F 0.034 0.035 0.001 12.743
Any 13-G 0.062 0.063 0.001 16.398
Any 13-D 0.049 0.050 0.001 15.655
Any 6-K 0.050 0.050 0.000 8.503
Any 20-F 0.045 0.045 0.000 3.991
Number of Unique CIKs 13.283 13.322 0.039 0.419
Total Clicks 86.960 88.512 1.552 1.379
Number of Unique Filing Types 2.565 2.589 0.024 18.364
Number of Unique File Extensions Types 1.391 1.473 0.082 482.507
Total Session Length (Hours) 0.598 0.615 0.017 36.679
Observations 34,976,165 39,864,724
Panel B: Daily-User Comparison Between Pre and Post 2008 of New Data
2003-2007 2008-2011   t-stat
Any 10-K or 10-Q 0.527 0.533 -0.005 -39.541
Any Proxy 0.130 0.116 0.014 155.416
Any Insider (3,4,5) 0.164 0.101 0.063 698.741
Any 8-K 0.267 0.281 -0.014 -116.292
Any S-1 0.078 0.091 -0.013 -162.146
Any Comment Letter 0.007 0.021 -0.014 -405.692
Any 13-F 0.023 0.034 -0.011 -242.345
Any 13-G 0.069 0.062 0.007 107.824
Any 13-D 0.052 0.049 0.003 48.357
Any 6-K 0.047 0.050 -0.002 -42.056
Any 20-F 0.042 0.045 -0.003 -50.918
Number of Unique CIKs 7.832 13.283 -5.451 -58.879
Total Clicks 31.806 86.960 -55.154 -53.637
Number of Unique Filing Types 2.559 2.565 -0.006 -4.045
Number of Unique File Extensions Types 1.551 1.391 0.161 841.529
Total Session Length (Hours) 0.487 0.598 -0.111 -219.793
Observations 21,144,241 34,976,165The Search for Benchmarks 41
Table A2.
Variable Description
Table A2 reports denitions of variables used in our regressions. We use CRSP monthly stock
returns and Compustat quarterly data for the sample period 2004{2013. CRSP variable names are in
parentheses and Compustat variable names are in square brackets. After collecting the raw Compustat
data, in accordance with Bhojraj et al. (2003), we drop all rm{quarter observations missing data on
total assets [atq], total long term debt [dlttq], net income before extraordinary items [ibq], debt in
current liabilities [lctq], or operating income after depreciation [oiadpq]. Further, we require the raw
share price on the last day of each scal quarter to be greater than $3, both total common equity [ceqq]
and total shareholder equity [seqq] to be positive, and net sales [saleq] to be more than $100 million.
Variable Description Calculation
returns Monthly cum-dividend stock returns (ret)
Valuation Multiples
pb Price-to-book ratio Market cap / total common equity
[ceqq]
evs Enterprise value- to- sales ratio (Market cap + long-term debt [dlttq])
/ net sales [saleq]
pe Price-to-earnings ratio Market cap net income before extraor-
dinary items [ibq]
Financial Statement Ratios
rnoa Return on net operating assets Net operating income after depreciation
[oiadpq] / (property, plant, and equip-
ment [ppentq] + current assets [actq] -
current liabilities [lctq])
roe Return on equity Net income before extraordinary items
[ibq] / total common equity [ceqq]
at (Inverse of) Asset turnover Total assets [atq] / net sales [saleq]
pm Prot margin Net operating income after depreciation
[oiadp] / net sales [saleq]
lev Leverage Long-term debt [dlttq] / total stock-
holder's equity [seqq]
Other Financial Information
salesgrowth One-year-ahead realized sales growth (Net sale one year ahead in the future
- current year net sales) / current year
net sales [saleq]
rdpersales R&D expense- to- sales ratio R&D expense [xrdq] / net sales [saleq]
ltgrowth Median analyst long-term growth fore-
cast
ltgrowth spread Standard deviation in analyst long-
term growth forecast
eps spread Standard deviation in analyst one-year-
ahead EPS forecast
coverage Number of analysts covering rm
size Market capitalization Price (prc)  shares outstanding
(shrout)The Search for Benchmarks 42
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Figure 1. Histogram of Unique Number of CIKs Accessed by Daily Human Users
on EDGAR. This gure plots the histogram of number of unique CIKs' fundamental infor-
mation accessed by daily IP addresses on EDGAR that is classied as \human" by our robot
identication rule. We dene search trac from an IP address in a given day as being gener-
ated from an automated script or a\robot"if the total number of CIKs whose fundamentals are
downloaded by this IP address exceeds the 95th percentile of the aggregate distribution in that
calendar year.The Search for Benchmarks 43
Table 1.
Trac Statistics
This table provides statistics on the sample of SEC EDGAR search trac occurring between January
2003 and December 2011. Panel A reports our ltering process and the number of observations
remaining after each ltering step. Step 1) reports the total number of ling downloads and the total
number of daily unique visitors. In Step 2) we restrict trac to users who search at least two unique
rms (CIK-based) in order to apply our co-search algorithm. In Step 3) to reduce the inuence of bulk
downloaders, we restrict searches to users who do not download more than a cuto of unique rms in
a given day. The cuto value corresponds to the number of unique CIKs downloaded at the 95% of all
users in a given calendar year. In Step 5) we keep only the trac page views for 10-K and 10-Qs and
their variants. Finally in Step 5) we restrict searches to base rms which were in the S&P1500 index as
of January 1st of the search trac year. Panel B reports the number of base rms for which we have
valid SBPs. Also reported are the median numbers of total peer rms available by calendar year for the
entire base rm sample.
Panel A. Data Filtering Steps
Filter Rule
# of Daily
Pageview
# of Daily
Unique Visitors
1) Raw Sample 3.72 billion 56.2 million
2) Keep if Unique CIKs> 1 3.55 billion 19.35 million
3) Keep if Unique CIKsAnnual 95% Cuto 351.45 million 16.63 million
4) Keep 10-K, 10-Q Searches 115.08 million 10.96 million
Panel B. Coverage of S&P1500 Universe Conditional on 10 Peer Firms
Year S&P500
Firms
S&P1500
Firms
Median Number
of Peer Firms
2004 470 1438 255
2005 471 1444 340
2006 469 1440 248
2007 474 1451 235
2008 485 1465 336
2009 491 1482 451
2010 494 1485 583
2011 491 1481 669
2012 489 1482 718
2013 484 1470 714T
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Table 2.
Co-Search Characteristics Across Filing Type
This table reports the average composition of the remainder of a search sequence of a daily-user in terms of searches for dierent document types
of other rms conditional on searching for a particular document type of a rm. The ling type 10-K includes 10-Qs and all amendment and small
business variants of each. The underlying data is constructed following the data ltering steps in Table 2 with the exception of ltering out 10-Ks
and 10-Qs to allow for cosearching across dierent ling types.
Type 10-K or 10-Q 8-K Comment Insider Other Proxy S-1
10-K or 10-Q 44.84% 16.50% 0.55% 5.47% 24.64% 5.18% 2.82%
8-K 23.36% 14.72% 0.66% 24.86% 21.78% 13.15% 1.45%
Comment 17.47% 21.59% 4.12% 17.36% 24.58% 7.71% 7.16%
Insider 26.11% 15.66% 0.58% 18.16% 21.56% 16.43% 1.49%
Other 17.21% 21.54% 7.46% 17.18% 22.08% 7.51% 7.02%
Proxy 42.64% 16.61% 0.64% 5.96% 21.48% 10.66% 2.00%
S-1 21.22% 20.62% 0.79% 20.00% 23.12% 10.51% 3.74%The Search for Benchmarks 45
Table 3.
Price Co-Movement Test 2004-2013
This table compares the average R2 values from monthly cross-sectional regressions of the form
Ri;t = t + tRpi;t + i;t
using CRSP returns data from January 2004 to December 2013. Columns 13 report average R2s
from monthly cross-sectional regressions, regressing base rm i's' returns in a given month t on the
concurrent returns of a portfolio pi of peers. Column 1 considers an equal-weighted portfolio of all
peer rms from the base rm's GICS6 industry; Column 2 considers an equal-weighted portfolio
(SBP EW) of the top 10 SBP rms, ranked by the prior calendar year's Annual Search Fraction
fij, dened as the fraction of daily-users searching for both rm i and j's' information on the same
day conditional on searching for rm i and any other rm 6= i, aggregated over the course of a
calendar year; Column 3 considers a portfolio (SBP TW) consisting of the top 10 SBP rms, with
each peer rm weighted by the prior calendar year's Annual Search Fraction (relative to the top 10
peer rms). With the exception of calendar year 2013, SBPs and portfolio weights are generated
based on prior calendar year's EDGAR search trac (e.g., the regressions in 2012 are generated
with weights from calendar year 2011). SBPs and portfolio weights for calendar year 2013 are
generated using search trac from calendar year 2011. Columns 4 and 5 test for the signicance of
the dierences in average R2s between the two SBP portfolio formulations and the GICS6 peer portfolios.
The results are reported for the sample of base rms that belonged to the S&P1500, S&P500,
and S&P1000 at the beginning of a given calendar year. To facilitate comparisons, all the regressions
are conducted using the same underlying set of rms. The variable N in parentheses represents the
average cross-sectional sample size for each monthly regression and standard errors are reported in
square brackets. Signicance levels are indicated by , ,  for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
GICS6 SBP EW SBP TW (2)-(1) (3)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SP1500 Base Firms 0.102 0.128 0.141 0.027 0.040
(N= 1,461) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003]
SP500 Base Firms 0.152 0.212 0.236 0.060 0.084
(N= 480) [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.004] [0.005]
SP1000 Base Firms 0.087 0.103 0.114 0.016 0.027
(N= 981) [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003]
Number of Months 120 120 120 120 120The Search for Benchmarks 46
Table 4.
Fundamentals Co-movement Test Over 2004-2013
This table compares the average R2 from quarterly cross-sectional regressions of the form
V ari;t = t + tV arpi;t + i;t
using most recently observable quarterly nancial statement data from Compustat and market capital-
ization data from CRSP on March, June, September, and December of each year from 2004 to 2013.
Columns 13 report average R2s from quarterly cross-sectional regressions, regressing base rm i's
V ar in a given month t on the concurrent V ar of a portfolio pi of peers. Each row considers a
dierent V ar, as dened in Table A2. Column 1 considers an equal-weighted portfolio of all peer
rms from the base rm's GICS6 industry; Column 2 considers an equal-weighted portfolio (SBP
EW) of the top 10 SBP rms, ranked by the prior calendar year's Annual Search Fraction fij,
dened as the fraction of daily-users searching for both rm i and j's' information on the same
day conditional on searching for rm i and any other rm 6= i, aggregated over the course of a
calendar year; Column 3 considers a portfolio (SBP TW) consisting of the top 10 SBP rms, with
each peer rm weighted by the prior calendar year's Annual Search Fraction (relative to the top 10
SBP rms). With the exception of calendar year 2013, SBPs and portfolio weights are generated
based on prior calendar year's EDGAR search trac (e.g., the regressions in 2012 are generated
with weights from calendar year 2011). SBPs and portfolio weights for calendar year 2013 are
generated using search trac from calendar year 2011. Columns 4 and 5 test for the signicance of
the dierences in average R2s between the two SBP portfolio formulations and the GICS6 peer portfolios.
Regressions are performed for the sample of rms that belong to the S&P1500, S&P500, and
S&P1000 base rms in Panels A, B, and C, respectively, as of the beginning of each calendar year. To
facilitate comparisons, all the regressions are conducted using the same underlying set of base rms.
In addition, for regressions involving pe, we also drop observations with negative net income before
extraordinary items, and for regressions involving rnoa, we drop observations when values are missing
for current assets, current liabilities, or property, plant, and equipment. The variable N in parentheses
represents the average cross-sectional sample size for each quarterly regression and standard errors
are reported in square brackets. Signicance levels are indicated by , ,  for 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.The Search for Benchmarks 47
Table 4.
(Continued)
Panel A: SP1500 Base Firms
GICS6 SBP EW SBP TW (2)-(1) (3)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Valuation Multiples
pb 0.048 0.115 0.112 0.067 0.064
(N= 978) [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
evs 0.297 0.425 0.465 0.127 0.168
(N= 977) [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
pe 0.031 0.040 0.045 0.009 0.013
(N= 878) [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
Financial Statement Ratios
rnoa 0.179 0.223 0.263 0.044 0.083
(N= 965) [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.004] [0.005]
roe 0.031 0.067 0.072 0.035 0.041
(N= 973) [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003]
at 0.406 0.559 0.598 0.153 0.192
(N= 977) [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
pm 0.199 0.340 0.385 0.141 0.186
(N= 972) [0.006] [0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.005]
lev 0.062 0.119 0.110 0.058 0.048
(N= 982) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004]
Other Financial Information
ltgrowth 0.242 0.280 0.312 0.038 0.070
(N= 814) [0.019] [0.016] [0.018] [0.005] [0.005]
salesgrowth 0.150 0.175 0.197 0.025 0.047
(N= 938) [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.006] [0.006]
rdpersales 0.648 0.688 0.723 0.040 0.075
(N= 976) [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Number of Months 40 40 40 40 40The Search for Benchmarks 48
Table 4.
(Continued)
Panel B: SP500 Base Firms
GICS6 SBP EW SBP TW (2)-(1) (3)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Valuation Multiples
pb 0.063 0.117 0.110 0.055 0.048
(N= 373) [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
evs 0.341 0.437 0.493 0.096 0.152
(N= 372) [0.008] [0.011] [0.010] [0.007] [0.006]
pe 0.037 0.050 0.060 0.014 0.023
(N= 348) [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.003] [0.005]
Financial Statement Ratios
rnoa 0.221 0.241 0.285 0.020 0.064
(N= 368) [0.011] [0.009] [0.012] [0.007] [0.007]
roe 0.042 0.078 0.077 0.036 0.036
(N= 373) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004]
at 0.377 0.552 0.598 0.175 0.221
(N= 374) [0.010] [0.008] [0.009] [0.006] [0.007]
pm 0.180 0.311 0.369 0.131 0.189
(N= 371) [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.006] [0.006]
lev 0.067 0.151 0.133 0.084 0.066
(N= 376) [0.004] [0.009] [0.008] [0.006] [0.006]
Other Financial Information
ltgrowth 0.275 0.323 0.370 0.049 0.095
(N= 341) [0.022] [0.019] [0.021] [0.008] [0.010]
salesgrowth 0.165 0.209 0.241 0.045 0.076
(N= 366) [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.007] [0.008]
rdpersales 0.722 0.720 0.758 -0.002 0.036
(N= 374) [0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004]
Number of Months 40 40 40 40 40The Search for Benchmarks 49
Table 4.
(Continued)
Panel C: SP1000 Base Firms
GICS6 SBP EW SBP TW (2)-(1) (3)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Valuation Multiples
pb 0.038 0.089 0.094 0.051 0.056
(N= 604) [0.002] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
evs 0.254 0.372 0.401 0.118 0.147
(N= 605) [0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
pe 0.034 0.038 0.041 0.004 0.007
(N= 529) [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Financial Statement Ratios
rnoa 0.158 0.191 0.226 0.033 0.069
(N= 596) [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.005] [0.006]
roe 0.030 0.048 0.059 0.018 0.029
(N= 600) [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
at 0.409 0.539 0.570 0.130 0.161
(N= 602) [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005]
pm 0.197 0.299 0.336 0.103 0.139
(N= 601) [0.006] [0.012] [0.012] [0.007] [0.007]
lev 0.063 0.113 0.107 0.050 0.044
(N= 605) [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Other Financial Information
ltgrowth 0.221 0.238 0.261 0.018 0.041
(N= 473) [0.019] [0.016] [0.018] [0.006] [0.006]
salesgrowth 0.144 0.156 0.174 0.012 0.031
(N= 572) [0.010] [0.010] [0.011] [0.006] [0.007]
rdpersales 0.578 0.647 0.679 0.069 0.101
(N= 601) [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005]
Number of Months 40 40 40 40 40T
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Table 5.
Correspondence with Alternative Benchmark Identication Schemes
Row 1 of Panel A reports the number of available base rms within the S&P1500 sample with valid benchmark rms for each identication scheme as of December 2012. Row
2 reports the average number of available benchmark rms for each specic scheme. Row 3 provides the average fraction of peers from each identication scheme which share
the same GICS6 grouping as the base rm. The rst scheme represents the search-based peers (SBP) of Lee, Ma, and Wang (2014), dened by applying the Annual search
fraction of Eq1 to the SEC EDGAR search trac data. The second, third, and fourth scheme represent peers selected solely based on the GICS2, GICS6, or SIC2 groupings
respectively. The fth scheme represents the list of rms that Google Finance (GOOGLE) reports as a base rm's\Related Firms"as of June 2014. The sixth scheme represents
the set of self-reported product market competitors disclosed in SEC lings and collected by CapitalIQ (CIQ). Specically, the CIQ peer set represents the union of the set of
rms j that rm i report as its competitors and also the set of rms j that report i as a competitor. The seventh scheme is the \Text Based Network Industry Classication"
(TNIC) of Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2014), and is derived from the set of peer rms with the most similar self-reported business descriptions in their 10-K lings to the
base rm's. The eighth scheme is the list of rms that Yahoo Finance (YHOO) reports as rms that, as of June 2014, are commonly co-searched with the base rm by its
users. The ninth scheme represents analyst co-coverage peers (ACP), similar to that of Israelsen (2014), Kaustia and Rantala (2013), and Muslu et al. (2014), dened by
applying the Analyst co-coverage fraction of Eq4 to the entire IBES sample. The nal scheme ACP (10) restricts the previous ACP scheme to retain only the top ten ACP rms.
Panel B reports the correspondence between Search-Based Peers (SBPs) and major alternative peer identication schemes. The rst column SBP Rank denotes the
ten closest SBPs as ranked by their search fraction in column 2. GICS2 and GICS6 represents the Global Industry Classication scheme at the 2 and 6 digit level. SIC2
represents the Standard Industry Classication scheme at the 2 digit level. The cells under each of the major classication schemes represent the probability that the alternative
classication and the corresponding ith ranked SBP both identify the same peer rm for a given base rm.
Panel A. Summary Statistics of Alternative Peer Classication Schemes
SBP GICS2 GICS6 SIC2 GOOGLE CIQ TNIC YHOO ACP ACP (10)
N Base Firms 1482 1496 1496 1498 1088 1160 1465 922 1291 1285
N Peers 10 200.7 36.7 61.91 7.69 5.13 79.18 5.04 94.39 10
Correspondence with GICS6 0.61 { { 0.40 0.69 0.59 0.48 0.28 0.39 0.69
Panel B. Correspondence Between SBPs and Major Alternatives
SBP
Rank
Search
Fraction GICS2 GICS6 SIC2 GOOGLE CIQ TNIC YHOO ACP ACP (10)
1 0.04 0.88 0.78 0.75 0.62 0.22 0.73 0.43 0.79 0.63
2 0.03 0.85 0.72 0.72 0.54 0.20 0.66 0.31 0.72 0.54
3 0.02 0.84 0.68 0.65 0.45 0.15 0.60 0.21 0.71 0.48
4 0.02 0.80 0.63 0.59 0.35 0.15 0.55 0.16 0.66 0.42
5 0.02 0.77 0.59 0.58 0.32 0.15 0.53 0.16 0.63 0.33
6 0.01 0.75 0.56 0.58 0.26 0.12 0.50 0.12 0.64 0.33
7 0.01 0.74 0.55 0.56 0.23 0.12 0.47 0.10 0.61 0.27
8 0.01 0.74 0.53 0.55 0.20 0.10 0.47 0.10 0.61 0.25
9 0.01 0.73 0.52 0.53 0.19 0.09 0.44 0.09 0.57 0.22
10 0.01 0.73 0.51 0.53 0.17 0.07 0.43 0.09 0.56 0.19
Total 0.02 0.78 0.61 0.61 0.33 0.14 0.54 0.18 0.65 0.37The Search for Benchmarks 51
Table 6.
Price Co-Movement Test: Comparison with Alternatives
This table compares the average R2 values from monthly cross-sectional regressions of the form
Ri;t = t + tRpi;t + i;t
using CRSP returns data. Columns 13 report average R2s from monthly cross-sectional re-
gressions, regressing base rm i's' returns in a given month t on the concurrent returns of a
portfolio pi of peers. Column 1 considers a portfolio of peers selected from various sources, from
Google Finance and Capital IQ in Panel A, to the Text Network Industry Classication (Hoberg and
Phillips, 2010, 2014) in Panel B, and nally Yahoo Finance and analysts' co-coverage of rms in Panel C.
Google Finance, Yahoo Finance, and Capital IQ peers comparisons span 24 months, from Jan-
uary 2012 to December 2013, and peer portfolio returns come from equal-weighted returns of peers.
The Text Network Industry Classication peers comparisons span 114 months, from January 2004
to June 2013. TNIC peers from scal year t are used in returns tests from July of t + 1 to June
of t + 2. Analyst co-covered peer rm comparisons span 120 months, from January 2004 to De-
cember 2013. \ACP [EW]" indicates that peer portfolio returns come from equal-weighted returns
of peers, and \ACP [VW]" indicates that peer portfolio returns come from a value-weighted returns
of peers, weighting by the relative magnitudes of a peer rm's co-coverage fraction. The last two
rows of Panel C restricts the analysis to the top 10 peer rms (\ACP10") by co-coverage fraction.
Column 2 considers an equal-weighted portfolio (SBP EW) of the top 10 SBP rms, ranked by
the prior calendar year's Annual Search Fraction fij, dened as the fraction of daily-users searching for
both rm i and j's' information on the same day conditional on searching for rm i and any other rm
6= i, aggregated over the course of a calendar year; Column 3 considers a portfolio (SBP TW) consisting
of the top 10 SBP rms, with each peer rm weighted by the prior calendar year's Annual Search Frac-
tion, (relative to the top 10 peer rms). With the exception of calendar year 2013, SBPs and portfolio
weights are generated based on prior calendar year's EDGAR search trac (e.g., the regressions in 2012
are generated with weights from calendar year 2011). SBPs and portfolio weights for calendar year 2013
are generated using search trac from calendar year 2011. Columns 4 and 5 test for the signicance of
the dierences in average R2s between the two SBP portfolio formulations and the GICS6 peer portfolios.
The results are reported for the sample of base rms that belonged to the S&P1500, S&P500,
and S&P1000 in Panel A, B, and C, respectively, at the beginning of a given calendar year. To facilitate
comparisons, all the regressions are conducted using the same underlying set of rms. The variable N in
parentheses represents the average cross-sectional sample size for each monthly regression and standard
errors are reported in square brackets. Signicance levels are indicated by , ,  for 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.The Search for Benchmarks 52
Table 6.
(Continued)
Panel A: SP1500 Base Firms
Alternative SBP EW SBP TW (2)-(1) (3)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A1: Google Finance (GOOGLE), Capital IQ (CIQ) Peers
GOOGLE 0.084 0.114 0.128 0.030 0.044
(N= 1,084) [0.007] [0.010] [0.010] [0.005] [0.005]
CIQ 0.030 0.098 0.113 0.069 0.083
(N= 1,121) [0.004] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
Number of Months 24 24 24 24 24
Panel A2: Text Network Industry Classication (TNIC) Peers
TNIC 0.077 0.132 0.145 0.055 0.068
(N= 1,412) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003]
Number of Months 114 114 114 114 114
Panel A3: Yahoo Finance (YHOO), Analyst Co-Coverage (ACP) Peers
YHOO 0.055 0.130 0.146 0.075 0.091
(N= 902) [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.011]
ACP [EW] 0.102 0.130 0.144 0.028 0.042
(N= 1,306) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003]
ACP [VW] 0.116 0.130 0.144 0.014 0.028
(N= 1,306) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003]
ACP10 [EW] 0.121 0.130 0.144 0.009 0.023
(N= 1,306) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.002]
ACP10 [VW] 0.126 0.130 0.144 0.004 0.018
(N= 1,306) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.002]
Number of Months 120 120 120 120 120The Search for Benchmarks 53
Table 6.
(Continued)
Panel B: SP500 Base Firms
Alternative SBP EW SBP TW (2)-(1) (3)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A1: Google Finance (GOOGLE), Capital IQ (CIQ) Peers
GOOGLE 0.139 0.186 0.216 0.047 0.077
(N= 412) [0.012] [0.018] [0.020] [0.010] [0.010]
CIQ 0.034 0.171 0.204 0.136 0.170
(N= 402) [0.005] [0.016] [0.017] [0.015] [0.016]
Number of Months 24 24 24 24 24
Panel A2: Text Network Industry Classication (TNIC) Peers
TNIC 0.115 0.216 0.240 0.101 0.125
(N= 464) [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.005] [0.006]
Number of Months 114 114 114 114 114
Panel A3: Yahoo Finance (YHOO), Analyst Co-Coverage (ACP) Peers
YHOO 0.153 0.186 0.216 0.034 0.064
(N= 413) [0.020] [0.018] [0.020] [0.011] [0.012]
ACP [EW] 0.148 0.212 0.237 0.063 0.089
(N= 419) [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.004] [0.006]
ACP [VW] 0.174 0.212 0.237 0.038 0.064
(N= 419) [0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.004] [0.005]
ACP10 [EW] 0.195 0.212 0.237 0.016 0.042
(N= 419) [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.003] [0.004]
ACP10 [VW] 0.207 0.212 0.237 0.004 0.030
(N= 419) [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.003] [0.003]
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Table 6.
(Continued)
Panel C: SP1000 Base Firms
Alternative SBP EW SBP TW (2)-(1) (3)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A1: Google Finance (GOOGLE), Capital IQ (CIQ) Peers
GOOGLE 0.066 0.088 0.097 0.022 0.031
(N= 671) [0.007] [0.009] [0.008] [0.004] [0.004]
CIQ 0.029 0.077 0.086 0.048 0.057
(N= 719) [0.004] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006]
Number of Months 24 24 24 24 24
Panel A2: Text Network Industry Classication (TNIC) Peers
TNIC 0.067 0.106 0.117 0.039 0.050
(N= 947) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003]
Number of Months 114 114 114 114 114
Panel A3: Yahoo Finance (YHOO), Analyst Co-Coverage (ACP) Peers
YHOO 0.037 0.103 0.113 0.065 0.076
(N= 488) [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
ACP [EW] 0.089 0.106 0.117 0.017 0.028
(N= 886) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.003]
ACP [VW] 0.099 0.106 0.117 0.007 0.018
(N= 886) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.002]
ACP10 [EW] 0.099 0.106 0.117 0.007 0.018
(N=886) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.002]
ACP10 [VW] 0.102 0.106 0.117 0.004 0.015
(N= 886) [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.002] [0.002]
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Table 7.
Fundamentals Co-movement Test: Comparison with Alternatives
This table compares the average R2 from quarterly cross-sectional regressions of the form
V ari;t = t + tV arpi;t + i;t
using most recently observable quarterly nancial statement data from Compustat and market capital-
ization data from CRSP on March, June, September, and December of each calendar year.
Odd columns report average R2s from quarterly cross-sectional regressions, regressing base rm i's
V ar in a given month t on the concurrent V ar of its portfolio pi. Each row considers a dierent V ar,
as dened in Table A2. Column 1 considers equal-weighted portfolios of peers from Google Finance
(GOOGLE); column 3 considers equal-weighted portfolios of peers from Capital IQ (CIQ); column 5
considers equal-weighted portfolios of peers from the text industry classication network (TNIC); column
7 considers equal-weighted portfolios of peers from Yahoo Finance (YHOO); column 9 considers equal-
weighted portfolios of analyst co-coverage peers (ACP); column 11 considers value-weighted portfolios of
ACPs, weighting by each peer rm's co-coverage fraction; column 13 considers equal-weighted portfolios
of base rms' top 10 ACPs by co-coverage fraction; column 15 considers value-weighted portfolios of
base rms' top 10 ACPs, weighting by each peer rm's co-coverage fraction. Even columns report
the dierences () in R2 generated by cross-sectional regressions of base rm V ar on SBP portfolio
V ar from R2s generated using the preceding column's peer identication scheme. Columns 12 and
16 compare the dierence between trac-weighted SBP portfolios with the respective value-weighted
portfolios of columns 11 and 15. All other dierences are with respect to equal-weighted SBP portfolios.
Regressions are performed for the sample of S&P1500 base rms in Panel A, S&P500 base rms
in Panel B, and S&P1000 base rms in Panel C. To facilitate comparisons, all the regressions are
conducted using the same underlying set of base rms. In addition, for regressions involving pe we also
drop observations with negative net income before extraordinary items and for regressions involving
rnoa we drop observations when values are missing for current assets, current liabilities, or property,
plant, and equipment. The variable N in parentheses represents the average cross-sectional sample size
for each quarterly regression and standard errors are reported in square brackets. Signicance levels are
indicated by , ,  for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.The Search for Benchmarks 56
Table 7.
(Continued)
Panel A: SP1500 Base Firms
GOOGLE  CIQ  TNIC  YHOO 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Valutaion Multiples
pb 0.036*** 0.101*** 0.010*** 0.099*** 0.039*** 0.078*** 0.114*** 0.022**
[0.004] [0.005] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.004] [0.008] [0.009]
evs 0.320*** 0.110*** 0.194*** 0.245*** 0.326*** 0.108*** 0.145*** 0.282***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.013] [0.014]
pe 0.023*** 0.009* 0.017*** 0.011 0.028*** 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.011**
[0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.007] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005]
Financial Statement Ratios
rnoa 0.222*** 0.022** 0.113*** 0.118*** 0.181*** 0.045*** 0.136*** 0.126***
[0.012] [0.009] [0.005] [0.010] [0.008] [0.006] [0.017] [0.010]
roe 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.014*** 0.046*** 0.025*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.028***
[0.005] [0.004] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.008] [0.007]
at 0.543*** 0.066*** 0.284*** 0.252*** 0.486*** 0.073*** 0.388*** 0.224***
[0.009] [0.006] [0.010] [0.010] [0.005] [0.004] [0.014] [0.016]
pm 0.297*** 0.033*** 0.128*** 0.186*** 0.246*** 0.103*** 0.069*** 0.255***
[0.011] [0.005] [0.006] [0.009] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.009]
lev 0.049*** 0.043*** 0.010*** 0.082*** 0.067*** 0.056*** 0.071*** 0.022***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.001] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.008] [0.004]
Other Financial Information
ltgrowth 0.133*** 0.085*** 0.026*** 0.125*** 0.211*** 0.078*** 0.190*** 0.054***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.003] [0.007] [0.016] [0.005] [0.010] [0.008]
salesgrowth 0.169*** 0.005 0.050*** 0.096*** 0.113*** 0.070*** 0.035*** 0.143***
[0.012] [0.006] [0.006] [0.011] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.010]
rdpersales 0.695*** -0.012** 0.549*** 0.116*** 0.636*** 0.060*** 0.389*** 0.323***
[0.007] [0.005] [0.013] [0.011] [0.006] [0.005] [0.028] [0.025]
No. Quarters 20 20 20 20 38 38 20 20The Search for Benchmarks 57
Table 7.
(Continued)
Panel A: SP1500 Base Firms Continued
ACP  ACP  ACP10  ACP10 
[EW] [EW] [VW] [VW] [EW] [EW] [VW] [VW]
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Valutaion Multiples
pb 0.077*** 0.039*** 0.084*** 0.026*** 0.079*** 0.036*** 0.083*** 0.027***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
evs 0.279*** 0.143*** 0.318*** 0.147*** 0.346*** 0.076*** 0.365*** 0.099***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003]
pe 0.033*** 0.010*** 0.039*** 0.007* 0.040*** 0.003 0.042*** 0.005
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
Financial Statement Ratios
rnoa 0.188*** 0.038*** 0.212*** 0.054*** 0.219*** 0.006* 0.232*** 0.035***
[0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.004] [0.008] [0.005]
roe 0.039*** 0.028*** 0.045*** 0.026*** 0.041*** 0.025*** 0.046*** 0.026***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003]
at 0.437*** 0.120*** 0.477*** 0.119*** 0.528*** 0.030*** 0.539*** 0.056***
[0.008] [0.006] [0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.003] [0.007] [0.004]
pm 0.230*** 0.106*** 0.263*** 0.117*** 0.285*** 0.051*** 0.301*** 0.079***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004]
lev 0.098*** 0.026*** 0.113*** 0.001 0.096*** 0.029*** 0.099*** 0.015***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004]
Other Financial Information
ltgrowth 0.242*** 0.043*** 0.276*** 0.042*** 0.293*** -0.009 0.311*** 0.007
[0.015] [0.006] [0.017] [0.007] [0.018] [0.005] [0.019] [0.006]
salesgrowth 0.110*** 0.068*** 0.133*** 0.067*** 0.144*** 0.034*** 0.150*** 0.050***
[0.007] [0.005] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.004] [0.008] [0.004]
rdpersales 0.629*** 0.062*** 0.675*** 0.053*** 0.698*** -0.007* 0.709*** 0.019***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003]
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Table 7.
(Continued)
Panel B: SP500 Base Firms
GOOGLE  CIQ  TNIC  YHOO 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Valutaion Multiples
pb 0.064*** 0.092*** 0.016*** 0.086*** 0.037*** 0.079*** 0.191*** -0.037***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.003] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.014] [0.012]
evs 0.340*** 0.089*** 0.176*** 0.249*** 0.354*** 0.099*** 0.267*** 0.169***
[0.007] [0.012] [0.009] [0.011] [0.012] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
pe 0.041*** -0.006 0.018*** 0.020** 0.041*** 0.010** 0.038*** -0.003
[0.007] [0.007] [0.003] [0.009] [0.005] [0.005] [0.009] [0.008]
Financial Statement Ratios
rnoa 0.279*** -0.001 0.136*** 0.118*** 0.212*** 0.025*** 0.255*** 0.027***
[0.016] [0.014] [0.008] [0.008] [0.011] [0.008] [0.012] [0.006]
roe 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.017*** 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.044*** 0.067*** 0.023***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008]
at 0.567*** 0.075*** 0.291*** 0.295*** 0.507*** 0.047*** 0.447*** 0.184***
[0.014] [0.007] [0.013] [0.015] [0.007] [0.006] [0.013] [0.005]
pm 0.331*** -0.017** 0.117*** 0.174*** 0.239*** 0.076*** 0.149*** 0.164***
[0.016] [0.007] [0.006] [0.014] [0.008] [0.007] [0.012] [0.009]
lev 0.072*** 0.054*** 0.019*** 0.101*** 0.060*** 0.096*** 0.067*** 0.060***
[0.009] [0.007] [0.005] [0.010] [0.005] [0.006] [0.008] [0.006]
Other Financial Information
ltgrowth 0.139*** 0.112*** 0.012*** 0.160*** 0.237*** 0.090*** 0.270*** -0.024**
[0.014] [0.009] [0.002] [0.009] [0.020] [0.007] [0.011] [0.010]
salesgrowth 0.214*** -0.002 0.047*** 0.128*** 0.145*** 0.073*** 0.089*** 0.123***
[0.018] [0.011] [0.007] [0.012] [0.010] [0.008] [0.011] [0.011]
rdpersales 0.754*** -0.036*** 0.535*** 0.153*** 0.678*** 0.047*** 0.486*** 0.232***
[0.010] [0.007] [0.011] [0.008] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006]
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Table 7.
(Continued)
Panel B: SP500 Base Firms Continued
ACP  ACP  ACP10  ACP10 
[EW] [EW] [VW] [VW] [EW] [EW] [VW] [VW]
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Valutaion Multiples
pb 0.097*** 0.022*** 0.106*** 0.002 0.096*** 0.023*** 0.098*** 0.010**
[0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.004] [0.007] [0.005]
evs 0.285*** 0.160*** 0.351*** 0.151*** 0.387*** 0.058*** 0.410*** 0.092***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] [0.008] [0.004] [0.009] [0.004]
pe 0.043*** 0.012** 0.052*** 0.011** 0.051*** 0.004 0.053*** 0.010**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Financial Statement Ratios
rnoa 0.236*** 0.006 0.263*** 0.025*** 0.259*** -0.017*** 0.268*** 0.020***
[0.009] [0.007] [0.010] [0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.010] [0.006]
roe 0.056*** 0.022*** 0.068*** 0.008* 0.057*** 0.022*** 0.063*** 0.013***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004]
at 0.412*** 0.138*** 0.459*** 0.139*** 0.533*** 0.017*** 0.549*** 0.049***
[0.011] [0.008] [0.011] [0.009] [0.007] [0.005] [0.008] [0.006]
pm 0.171*** 0.128*** 0.217*** 0.137*** 0.257*** 0.043*** 0.272*** 0.082***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.008] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005]
lev 0.108*** 0.044*** 0.124*** 0.007 0.097*** 0.054*** 0.098*** 0.033***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Other Financial Information
ltgrowth 0.230*** 0.102*** 0.275*** 0.105*** 0.316*** 0.016** 0.342*** 0.039***
[0.014] [0.011] [0.015] [0.011] [0.018] [0.007] [0.020] [0.007]
salesgrowth 0.133*** 0.084*** 0.166*** 0.082*** 0.181*** 0.037*** 0.188*** 0.060***
[0.010] [0.007] [0.011] [0.007] [0.011] [0.006] [0.011] [0.006]
rdpersales 0.668*** 0.054*** 0.723*** 0.038*** 0.742*** -0.020*** 0.751*** 0.010**
[0.009] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
No. Quarters 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40The Search for Benchmarks 60
Table 7.
(Continued)
Panel C: SP1000 Base Firms
GOOGLE  CIQ  TNIC  YHOO 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Valutaion Multiples
pb 0.018*** 0.085*** 0.005*** 0.088*** 0.039*** 0.052*** 0.068*** 0.033***
[0.004] [0.006] [0.001] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.008] [0.009]
evs 0.258*** 0.117*** 0.178*** 0.227*** 0.286*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.281***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.006] [0.010] [0.012]
pe 0.019*** 0.014** 0.021*** 0.008 0.026*** 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.017**
[0.004] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.006]
Financial Statement Ratios
rnoa 0.172*** 0.021** 0.102*** 0.086*** 0.160*** 0.035*** 0.074*** 0.131***
[0.011] [0.008] [0.007] [0.017] [0.008] [0.006] [0.011] [0.009]
roe 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.038*** 0.017**
[0.004] [0.005] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.008] [0.007]
at 0.501*** 0.053*** 0.246*** 0.201*** 0.447*** 0.091*** 0.351*** 0.226***
[0.008] [0.007] [0.010] [0.009] [0.006] [0.005] [0.020] [0.020]
pm 0.214*** 0.036*** 0.114*** 0.126*** 0.225*** 0.088*** 0.041*** 0.207***
[0.010] [0.006] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.011]
lev 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.008** 0.073*** 0.083*** 0.036*** 0.079*** -0.002
[0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.009] [0.008] [0.006] [0.010] [0.005]
Other Financial Information
ltgrowth 0.120*** 0.053*** 0.049*** 0.074*** 0.195*** 0.058*** 0.131*** 0.096***
[0.007] [0.009] [0.006] [0.008] [0.015] [0.005] [0.012] [0.012]
salesgrowth 0.143*** 0.009 0.054*** 0.070*** 0.097*** 0.067*** 0.019*** 0.133***
[0.011] [0.007] [0.008] [0.013] [0.008] [0.007] [0.004] [0.012]
rdpersales 0.620*** 0.017** 0.562*** 0.075*** 0.595*** 0.062*** 0.325*** 0.377***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.016] [0.014] [0.006] [0.006] [0.031] [0.025]
No. Quarters 20 20 20 20 38 38 20 20The Search for Benchmarks 61
Table 7.
(Continued)
Panel C: SP1000 Base Firms Continued
ACP  ACP  ACP10  ACP10 
[EW] [EW] [VW] [VW] [EW] [EW] [VW] [VW]
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Valutaion Multiples
pb 0.052*** 0.037*** 0.057*** 0.037*** 0.053*** 0.036*** 0.057*** 0.037***
[0.003] [0.006] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004]
evs 0.261*** 0.101*** 0.279*** 0.115*** 0.282*** 0.080*** 0.302*** 0.092***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
pe 0.032*** 0.008* 0.038*** 0.005 0.038*** 0.002 0.040*** 0.003
[0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004]
Financial Statement Ratios
rnoa 0.165*** 0.027*** 0.185*** 0.043*** 0.187*** 0.004 0.200*** 0.028***
[0.007] [0.006] [0.008] [0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.005]
roe 0.030*** 0.018*** 0.036*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.017*** 0.034*** 0.025***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
at 0.430*** 0.106*** 0.463*** 0.105*** 0.495*** 0.041*** 0.506*** 0.063***
[0.007] [0.005] [0.008] [0.006] [0.007] [0.004] [0.007] [0.005]
pm 0.237*** 0.063*** 0.260*** 0.078*** 0.265*** 0.035*** 0.281*** 0.057***
[0.008] [0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.009] [0.004] [0.009] [0.005]
lev 0.101*** 0.019*** 0.116*** -0.002 0.105*** 0.016*** 0.109*** 0.005
[0.009] [0.006] [0.010] [0.007] [0.009] [0.006] [0.009] [0.006]
Other Financial Information
ltgrowth 0.237*** 0.005 0.264*** 0.003 0.267*** -0.025*** 0.279*** -0.012*
[0.017] [0.006] [0.019] [0.006] [0.020] [0.007] [0.020] [0.007]
salesgrowth 0.099*** 0.059*** 0.118*** 0.059*** 0.126*** 0.032*** 0.132*** 0.045***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] [0.005] [0.008] [0.005]
rdpersales 0.598*** 0.054*** 0.630*** 0.056*** 0.646*** 0.006 0.659*** 0.027***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.005]
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Table 8.
Base Firm Characteristics and Agreement between SBP and ACP
This table reports results from three dierent regression specications. Observations are at the rm-year
level. Columns 1 and 2 report ordinary least squares (\OLS") regressions of the % agreement between a
base rm's top 10 SBPs and ACPs on base rm characteristics. Columns 3 and 4 reports OLS regressions
similar to 1 and 2, but uses as the dependent variable: log of 1 + % agreement (\Log"). Columns 5
and 6 report results of ordered logit (\OLogit") regressions of the number of rms disagreed upon among
the top 10 SBPs and ACPs on base rm characteristics. \log size" is the log of the base rm's market
capitalization. \complexity" is the number of reported segments with distinct SIC2 classications. Year
xed eects are included throughout but coecients are suppressed for ease of reporting. Even columns
include additional controls that require availability of data from I/B/E/S. Standard errors are two-way
clustered at the base-rm and year level. Signicance levels are indicated by , ,  for 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS Log Log OLogit OLogit
log size 0.0542 -0.0059 0.0409 -0.0030 0.4432 -0.0419
[0.0046] [0.0047] [0.0034] [0.0033] [0.0398] [0.0392]
pb -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0001
[0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0007] [0.0003]
evs -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
pe -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000]
rnoa 0.0014 0.0016 0.0011 0.0012 0.0117 0.0141
[0.0008] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0057] [0.0036]
at 0.0002 -0.0020 0.0004 -0.0010 0.0036 -0.0075
[0.0042] [0.0053] [0.0030] [0.0037] [0.0318] [0.0435]
lev 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0013 0.0002
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0012] [0.0004]
salesgrowth 0.0080 0.0228 0.0052 0.0157 0.0772 0.1904
[0.0101] [0.0214] [0.0071] [0.0153] [0.0718] [0.1877]
rdpersales 0.0129 -0.1409 0.0116 -0.0881 0.1189 -0.9245
[0.0144] [0.0751] [0.0108] [0.0524] [0.1128] [0.6360]
complexity -0.0245 -0.0128 -0.0180 -0.0093 -0.1929 -0.1012
[0.0037] [0.0043] [0.0027] [0.0032] [0.0307] [0.0380]
coverage 0.0124 0.0088 0.1068
[0.0013] [0.0009] [0.0118]
ltgrowth -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0138
[0.0006] [0.0004] [0.0052]
eps spread 0.0057 -0.0018 0.0844
[0.0530] [0.0360] [0.5138]
ltgrowth spread 0.0019 0.0014 0.0151
[0.0009] [0.0006] [0.0090]
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Table 9.
Explaining Top Peers: SBP vs. ACP
In columns 12 (34), the sample consists of the top 10 SBPs(ACPs) to each base rm in our sample as
well as all other rms from the same GICS2 sector with the dependent variable an indicator for being a top
10 SBP(ACP) to a base rm in our sample. Explanatory variables are decile ranked absolute percentage
dierence in rm fundamentals between the base rm and the peer rm (j
peer
base  1j). \Supply Chain"is an
indicator variable equaling 1 when the base and peer rm are supply chain partners. \Dierent GICS4"
is an indicator variable equaling 1 when the base rm and the peer rm belong to dierent 4-digit GICS
industry groupings. Year xed eects are included throughout. Marginal eects (\MFX") from probit
estimation is reported, and are evaluated at 1 for all explanatory variables with the exception of\Supply
Chain," \Dierent GICS4" and the year xed eects, which are evaluated at 0. Standard errors are
clustered at the base-rm level. Signicance levels are indicated by , ,  for 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SBP Top 10
MFX
SBP Top 10
MFX
ACP Top 10
MFX
ACP Top 10
MFX
size 0.0038 0.0069 0.0006 0.0024
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
pb 0.0004 0.0007 0.0010 0.0010
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
pe -0.0052 -0.0051 -0.0046 -0.0024
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
rnoa -0.0037 -0.0027 -0.0047 -0.0025
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
roe -0.0003 0.0010 -0.0009 0.0008
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
at -0.0054 -0.0052 -0.0047 -0.0029
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
evs -0.0029 -0.0028 -0.0022 -0.0014
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lev -0.0012 -0.0020 -0.0019 -0.0017
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
salesgrowth -0.0037 -0.0021 -0.0041 -0.0014
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rdpersales -0.0022 -0.0010 -0.0058 -0.0037
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
coverage -0.0034 -0.0024
(0.001) (0.001)
eps spread -0.0007 -0.0011
(0.000) (0.000)
ltgrowth -0.0035 -0.0033
(0.000) (0.000)
ltgrowth spread -0.0023 -0.0020
(0.000) (0.000)
Supply Chain 0.4001 0.3052 0.3584 0.1900
(0.027) (0.033) (0.031) (0.027)
Dierent GICS4 -0.0336 -0.0783 -0.0643 -0.1567
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009)
Observations 3,446,653 842,448 3,467,536 845,112
Pseudo R2 0.0670 0.0878 0.0870 0.1237The Search for Benchmarks 64
Table 10.
Performance of Composite Peers
This table compares the average R2 values from monthly cross-sectional regressions of the form
Ri;t = t + tRpi;t + i;t
using CRSP returns data from January 2004 to December 2013. Columns 12 of Panel A and
columns 13 of Panel B report average R2s from monthly cross-sectional regressions, regressing
base rm i's returns in a given month t on the concurrent returns of the relevant peer portfolio
pi. Column 1 considers an equal-weighted portfolio top 10 SBP rms, ranked by the prior calendar
year's Annual Search Fraction fij, dened as the fraction of daily-users searching for both rm
i and j's' information on the same day conditional on searching for rm i and any other rm
6= i, aggregated over the course of a calendar year; Column 2 considers an equal-weighted port-
folio of peer rms that belong to both the top 10 SBP and ACP portfolios; Column 3 considers
an equal-weighted portfolio of peer rms that belong to either the top 10 SBP or ACP portfolios.
The results are reported for the sample of base rms that belonged to the S&P1500, S&P500,
or S&P1000 index at the beginning of each calendar year. To facilitate comparisons, all the regressions
are conducted using the same underlying set of rms. Panel A considers the subset of base rms that
have both ACPs and SBPs; Panel B considers the subset of Panel A base rms that have overlapping
ACPs and SBPs. The variable N in parentheses represents the average cross-sectional sample size for
each monthly regression and standard errors are reported in square brackets. Signicance levels are
indicated by , ,  for 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
SBP SBP\ACP SBP[ACP (2)-(1) (3)-(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Base Firms with ACP and SBP
SP1500 Base Firms 0.130 0.141 0.012
(N= 1,311) [0.006] [0.006] [0.001]
SP500 Base Firms 0.211 0.218 0.008
(N= 422) [0.008] [0.008] [0.002]
SP1000 Base Firms 0.106 0.117 0.011
(N= 889) [0.005] [0.006] [0.001]
Panel B: Base Firms with Overlapping Peers
SP1500 Base Firms 0.143 0.113 0.153 -0.030 0.010
(N= 1,199) [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.002] [0.001]
SP500 Base Firms 0.214 0.192 0.220 -0.022 0.006
(N= 413) [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.003] [0.002]
SP1000 Base Firms 0.119 0.091 0.130 -0.028 0.010
(N= 785) [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.002] [0.001]
Number of Months 120 120 120 120 120